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With the increasing importance of the military as a
means for accomplishing national objectives , the military
dimension of foreign-policy formulation has been extended
across the full spectrum of the policy process* This paper
examines politico-military policy formulation in the Depart-
ment of Defense* The purpose is to determine if an adequate
structure for the formulation of such policy exists*
The author first explores the significant aspects in
the evolution of the Department of Defense* The several
policy units in the Department are then identified and ex-
amined* An evaluation is made of the effectiveness of the
existing Defense organization and significant structural
defects are delineated* An analysis of the defects results
in a determination of their basic causes* The author then
envisions a Defense organisation that is devoid of structural
defect and advances a plan for reorganization*
The author concludes that the policy units of the
Department of Defense function within a structure that is
permeated with defects* The defects of the structure affect
the performance of the policy units, the efficiency of the
entire Department, and the credibility of the national de-
fense posture* Analysis reveals that these defects can be
traced to three basic causes—violations of the basic prin-
ciples of organization, civilian-military conflict, and inter-
sex:vice rivalry.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Once the United States achieved great-power status,
participation in the conduct of world affairs could no longer
be avoided* Failure of the diplomatic community to resolve
the disputes between nations by peaceful means resulted in
two total wars of global proportions during the first half
of the Twentieth Century* The involvement of the united
States in the ruptures of World War I and World War II was
inevitable*
The decline of Europe and Japan* as a result of World
War II, left the world with two super powers , the United
States and the Soviet Union* As ideological differences be-
tween the two were reflected in opposing national objectives
and conflicting courses of action, the possibility of a
third world war became a matter of critical concern* The
advent of thermonuclear weapons added an awesome element to
total war*
The threat to the national existence of the United
States posed by Communist power bred a feeling of insecurity,
and precipitated a revolution in American foreign relations*
The fundamental safety of the nation became the primary con-








2Matters of domestic policy were relegated to an order of
secondary importance*
The national interest in self-defense, when applied
to the contemporary world situation, has resulted in a se-
lection of objectives which dictate the maintenance of a
substantial military establishment. Many of the courses of
action required to advance these national objectives now in-
volve the application of military force or the threat of
application of military force as a means* With the increas-
ing importance of the military, as a means, foreign-policy
makers have had to take into account united States military
capabilities and the military capabilities of other states*
The necessary injection of professional military judgment
into such calculations has resulted in the development of a
body of military policy*
The relation of military policy to foreign policy has
been the subject of considerable debate* It seems clear
that foreign policy must be superior to military policy, as
military considerations do not determine which national ob-
jectives are appropriate* The selection of objectives,
however, may be limited by the availability of military
means* Foreign policy and military policy must be coordi-
nated to provide an effective combination of ends and means*
The product of such integration may be considered to repre-







3The professional military makes its influence felt
throughout the foreign policy process* With military intel-
ligence as a tool, the military expert participates in the
preparation of situational estimates* He assists in estab-
lishing alternate possible courses of action and in measur-
ing the probable consequences of each* Once decisions are
made, decisions for which the military must accept an in-
creased burden of responsibility* the manner in which the
military assists in the implementation stage does much to
precipitate new world situations* The new situations are
assessed and the never-ending policy-making process is begun
again*
The increasing role of the military in the formula-
tion of national security policy has caused concern in the
minds of many students of democratic government* Some have
chosen to criticize the "military mind*" Others have been
concerned about the maintenance of civilian supremacy* Many
would limit the military to the role of expert advisers*
These concerns lend importance to any creditable study of
military participation in policy formulation*
This paper will examine politico-military policy for-
mulation in the Department of Defense* The purpose is to
determine if an adequate structure for the formulation of
such policy exists * For th<5 purposes of the study, politico-








4policy which is integrated with foreign policy to form na-
tional security policy* It may also be considered to be the
military dimension of foreign policy* Further definition is
not essential and depends e lely on the distinctions made
between foreign policy and national security policy*
Prior to any consideration of politico-military
policy formulation in the Department of Q&fenae, it is nec-
essary to examine the organization of the Department itself*
Such examination of the present Defense structure can be en-
riched by including an exploration of the significant as-
pects in the evolution of the Department of Defense* Such
is the task of Chapter II*
The next three chapters will identify the several
policy units of the Department* The place of these units in
the organizational structure, their internal organization,
their functions* their staffing, and the procedures they
employ in policy formulation will be related* Methods of
horizontal coordination and channels for advancing policy
positions will be fully treated*
Chapter VI will evaluate the effectiveness of the
existing Defense organization, identify and delineate sig-
nificant structural defects, and analyze these defects in
order to determine their basic causes. The burden of Chap-








5The author will then attempt to digest the substance
of the first seven chapters and to envision a Dof&iam organi-
sation that is devoid of . uctural defect* The plan for
such a structure will be described in Chapter VIII* Exami-
nation of the resultant impact on politico-military policy
formulation in the Department of Defense will, it is hoped,
conclude the study on an affirmative note.
Charts provide a readier, if imperfect, comprehension
of the organisation of an enterprise than does textual state-
ment* They render a vicarious service as a discipline for
the writer, by challenging the clarity of his conceptions*
Therefore, organization charts are provided throughout the
study to support the text*
The conclusions reached have b**n based on recent
study, are the author •s own, and in no way reflect the offi-








EVOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE
The nature of the existing Department of Defense
organization must be thoroughly explored before any signifi-
cant examination of the machinery for politico-military
policy formulation is possible* The present organisation
has been the product of an evolutionary, rather than a revo-
lutionary, process* A review of the evolution of the
Department of Defense is germane to any consideration of its
present structure and facilitates fuller understanding of
the various nuances of the policy units it encompasses*
Prior to tracing the evolution of the Department of
Defense, it is interesting to reflect upon the really la*
mense nature of the organisation being considered* The
assets of the Department exceed $180 billion, or twice the
combined assets of the one hundred largest manufacturing
concerns in the United States* The annual operating budget
of over $50 billion can be represented by forty stacks of
$1,000 bills, each higher than the Washington Monument* It
is easy to understand why the Department of Defense is the
biggest purchaser in the United States, and second only to
For a discussion of the impact of Defense contracts
on American cities, see D. s. Greenberg, "Who Runs America? M
Science, CXXXVIII, November 16, 1962, p. 798.
••"•
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7the Department of Interior as a real estate operator* The
policies of the Department directly affect the lives of some
nine million people and their families. There are 2*7 mil-
lion men in the Armed Forces; 1.5 million civilian employees;
250,000 employed foreign nationals; 4*5 million reservists;
2
and 325,000 retired military personnel* The complex organi-
zation for administrating kills argantuan establishment had
a meager parentage*
Prelude to Unification . In the post-Revolutionary
War period, both the Army and the Navy were unified in one
governmental department* By 1798, naval operations and
facilities had grown to such proportions that Congress
deemed necessary the establishment of t separate Navy Depart-
ment* In the years that followed, the Navy's mission was
clearly to defeat the Nation *s enemies on the high seas, and
the Army*s mission was to defeat enemies on land* Since
land operations were confined to the North American Conti-
nent, there was little need for coordination between the two
services* The war with Spain, in 1898, extended the dimen-
sions of united States military activity and precipitated a
requirement for joint Army-Navy action in the defense of
overseas areas* By agreement between the Secretaries of the
2
"Defense Organization," Armed Forces Management » VI,




War and Navy Departments, the Joint Board was created in
31903 to coordinate the plans of the two services.
The Joint Board was composed of four Army and four
Navy officers, and its first ling officer was Admiral
Dewey, hero of Manila Bay* (See Chart 1, p. 9*) The excel-
lent opportunities for joint operational planning were en-
cumbered by lack of support by the two services and a tend-
ency for the Board to vacillate on major issues* Thus, in
1908, the Board suspended its sessions for prolonged periods*
By the time of World War I, it had practically ceased to
exist*
After World War I, the United states emerged as a
world power with an attendant growth of interests and commit-
ments overseas* An evident requirement for joint planning
resulted in the reconstitution and reorganisation of the
Joint Board* It was provided with a Joint Planning Commit-
tee, but no command authority* The recommendations of the
Board required service approval prior to implementation* It
did develop many defense and contingency plans, and in 1927
5promulgated the first "Joint Action of the Army and Navy."
"Jacx D # Nicholas, Staff Officer's Manual (Harrisburgt
Stackpole Company, 1959), p* 2.
4See ibid *, p* 3 for a discussion of the lacx of co-
ordination during World War I.



















Chart 1. The Joint Board—1903
COMMAND (LINE) PLANNING (STAFF)
.
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On July 5, 1939, the President removed the Joint
Board from departmental control and placed It directly under
the Commander In Chief* A series of ad hoc committees were
established to assist the Joint Planning Committee In the
preparation of war plans* The Joint Board continued to
operate until the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was
created In early 1942. (See Chart 2, p. 11.)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was developed
to provide a working group to function with the British
Chiefs of Staff Committee* When operating as one body, the
two organizations were known as the Combined Chiefs of
6Staff. To match the British counterpart In the Royal Air
Force, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces joined
the two service chiefs with co-equal status* Admiral Leahy,
Aide to the President, acted as chairman and Presidential
liaison officer for both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
7Combined Chiefs of Staff* The Joint Chiefs of Staff were
responsible for coordinating United States military effort
in World War II and reported directly to the Commander In
An excellent treatment of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff was made by Timothy w* Stanley, American gefense and
National Security (first edition; Washington: Public
Affairs Press , 1$56 ) , p* 71.








































Chart 2. The Joint Board—1939
COMMAND (LINE) n.»i PLANNING (STAFF)
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gChief* The planning and operating substructure was a vast
series of committees composed of representatives from the
services* (See Chart 3, p* 13*)
So strong was the common purpose during World War II
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to prosecute the
war effectively* The absence of centralized unity of com-
mand and the lack of structural integrity were the two major
unresolved problems of the organisation* While unified
theater commands were established, the only centralised
unity was that which could be provided by the President*
The loose federation of large groups of separate committees,
whose members had primary responsibility to their services,
was not conducive to the effective resolution of divergent
views*
National Security Act of 1947 * The provisions of the
first successful legislative attempt to achieve unification
of the Armed Forces resulted in the most comprehensive or-
ganisational change in the history of the military establish-
ment of the United States* Unsuccessful attempts to provide
unification legislation had been made since 1925* Over
fifty bills or resolutions were intr duced in Congress, but
8The Constitution of the United States provides that
the President act as Commander in Chief*
9This problem was explained by Nicholas, op * cit *.
p. 11*
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Chart 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff—1942





not until after the lessons of World War II was the public
to realise that separate ground and sea warfare was gone
forever and that contemporary warfare demanded the combina-
tion of elements of force in one single concerted effort*
Many unification proposals were made before conference
,
accommodation, and compromise precipitated the National
Security Act of 1947*
The Woodrum Committee of the House of Representatives
considered an Army plan for unification as early as 1944*
Before hearings of the committee, the plan was presented*
It called for a single executive department, a Secretary of
the Armed Forces, an Undersecretary for each of the Armed
Forces, a common supply agency, and a Joint Chiefs of staff
organisation headed by a military Chief of Staff to the
President* (See Chart 4, p. 15*) The Navy was noncommittal
on the plan, and the committee recommended further study*
The Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned the Richardson
Committee to study plans for unification of the Armed Forces*
The committee heard the testimony of over eight hundred
military officers and subsequently presented a plan on April
11, 1945* The plan envisioned a single executive department,
a Secretary of the Armed Forces, a Commander of the Armed
10Th. N.vy would not consider
-y pi- for unifies
tion at the time* See Stanley, op * cit * * p* 72*
I>.• : I I J
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Chart 4. Woodrum Committee Plan—1944









Forces, a General Staff, three armed services, and unified
theater commands. It also provided for a Chief of Staff
organization to advise the President* (See Chart 5, p* 17.)
No executive action was taken to secure support for the
11Richardson Plan*
Before hearings of the Senate Military Affairs Com-
mittee, the Army presented its final plan in the summer of
1945* This plan called for a single executive department, a
Secretary of the Armed Forces, an Undersecretary, and Assist-
ant Secretaries for research, procurement and mobilisation,
and legislative and public affairs* It also provided a
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces who would command the
three services, the unified theater commands, and a common
supply agency* A Joint Chiefs of Staff organisation, headed
by a Chief of Staff to the President , was envisioned as an
advisory agency* (See Chart 6, p« 18*) The Navy, fearing
loss of its naval aviation and Marine Corps, opposed the plan
on the grounds that a balanced force was not insured*
The Army»s position was one favoring strong central-
ised command of the Armed Forces* The hopeful proponents of
a separate Air Force supported that p sition believing that
it best insured them co-equal status* The Navy opposed all






























Chart 5. Richardson Committee Plan—1945































Chart 6. Army Plan— 1945.
COMMAND (LINE) ADVICE (STAFF) ADMIN (STAFF)
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unification plans, citing the need for balanced forces, the
failure of the German military unification, the separate
service successes of World War II, and the critical need to
12
maintain strong civilian control of each military element.
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, realising that
the Navy would have to devise a constructive alternate plan
for unification, appointed Ferdinand Eberstadt to head a
committee on organisation* In October 1945, the Eberstadt
Flan emerged and provided for a National Security Council, a
National Security Resources Board, a Joint Chiefs of staff,
a Munitions Board, and three Service Secretaries, all directly
under the President. The plan provided for unified action
through a series of coordinating committees* (See Chart 7,
p. 20*)
On December 19, 1945, President Truman asked Congress
to provide legislation which would establish one executive
department for the Armed Forces* In May 1946, he called
upon the services to agree on a plan for unification* A
compromise plan was developed and presented to the Congress*
- 9
The Navy is by far the more conservative of the
armed services* As such, it has always been quick to defend
tradition and reject change* For a reflection of this Navy




13Secretary Forrestal injected himself into the work












































SEC ARMY SEC NAVY SEC AIR FORCE
Chart 7. Navy (Eberstadt) Plan—1945.
COMMAND (LINE) — STAFF FUNCTIONS
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Thus, the National Security Act of 1947 was passed and was
signed by the President on July 26, 1S47. It was, in fact,
a piece of compromise legislation but did provide a basis
for some central unified effort by the Armed Forces of the
United States.
The National Security Act of 1947 provided for the
following: creation of a separate and equal Air Force; three
military departments, with a civilian Secretary for each;
creation of a single National Military Establishment, under
a Secretary of DmttmMm t with "general authority, direction,
and control** over the three military departments} authority
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; creation of a Munitions
Board and a Research and Development Board, to coordinate
inter-service activities in those particular fields; estab-
lishment of a National Security Council and a National
Security Resources Board; and establishment of a Central
16
Intelligence Agency* (See Chart 3, p. 22.) This structure
14
This was the first legislative recognition of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
IS
For a detailed discussion of tie evolution and
early operation of the National Security Council, see Robert
Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council,'1
Foreign Affairs , XXXIV, April 1956.
16
The Central Intelligence Agency was to come directly
under the National Security Council* This was one of many
cases of "command by committee." See William R. Kintner,
Forging a New Sword (first edition; New York: Harper and
Brothers7 1*58) , p. 24.




































Chart 8, Department of Defense—1947.
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represented a compromise between the Army's traditional
preference for a tightly organised staff operation and the
Navy's historical tendency to use a committee system for
reaching politico-military decisions* The military depart-
ments were to be administered as individual executive de-
partments, and they were granted an expressed right to appeal
to the President and to the Bureau of tht Budget over the
head of the Secretary of Defense*
The Secretary of Defense was forced to proceed , by
methods of cooperation, negotiation, conference, and compro-
17
mise* It became a common practice for the military
departments to debate the extent of authority vested by the
Act in the Secretary of Defense* With joint service member-
ship on the Munitions Board, the Research and Development
Board, and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organisation, effec-
tive action was limited to areas of agreement or mutual
compromise* It became increasingly apparent that the law
did not provide for unification, but for confederation*
The National Security Act avoided any delineation of
the roles and missions of the several services* To resolve
tensions which immediately developed >ver these issues, a
series of meetings was held at Key West, Florida, during
March 1948 and at Newport, Rhode Island, during August of
17Ibld*. p. 26.






the same year* These meetings, together with the pressures
of increasing world tension, precipitated the Key West
agreement* The agreement delineated primary and collateral
functions for the elements of the National Military Estab-
lishment. All services were to provide for the security of
the United States, maintain required bases, collect intel-
ligence, maintain a r9»erve t develop weapons, and conduct
procurement and supply functions* The Joint Chiefs of Staff
were to prepare strategic and logistic plans, formulate
Joint politico-military policy, determine military and
budgetary requirements, establish unified commands in stra-
tegic areas, and provide general direction for all combat
operations* Primary responsibilities for amphibious war-
fare, airborne operations, and anti-submarine warfare were
fairly well delineated* Air defense responsibility was not
adequately defined* The questions of Army aviation, missile
18development, and missile control were ignored*
Limited achievements of the new Department of Defense
organisation included t formulation of long and short-range
strategic plans, some coordination of udget requests and
legislative programs, closer coordination of procurement and
mobilization planning, and creation of the Military Air
Roles and missions dictate force requirements and
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Transport Service. There was some integration of research
and development effort. A Weapons System Evaluation Group
was created to provide for the independent technical and
19
operational evaluation of weapon systems. The long-needed
correlation of effective joint planning, strati jic concepts,
research and development efforts, budget processes, and
service roles and missions was not completely achieved.
The services continued to harbor doubts over the na-
ture of unification, debates developed over the authority of
the Secretary of Defense, and the fires never died on the
issue of roles and missions. The ensuing events are a mat-
ter of history: Secretary of Defense Porrestal had a
nervous breakdown and subsequently committed suicide; his
successor, Louis A. Johnson, canceled construction of the
aircraft carrier United States ; the objections of naval
leaders resulted in Congressional hearings in the summer of
1949; Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan resigned; and
Congress investigated alleged deficiencies in the B-36
bomber procurement program.
Throughout the period, one of the most distressing
problems was the generation of diverse military views on
critical issues. This in itself might be accepted if the
views were honest positions based only upon national
19For a full treatment of the initial achievements of
the Department of Defense, see Kintner, 0£. cit . , p. 28.
i
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interests. The unquieting feature was that these diverse
views were presented to the National Security Council. The
Secretary of Defense and the three Service Secretaries were
members of the Council. All members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were advisers to the Council and could express their
service positions directly. As a result , the services gave
the impression that the nation's military professionals
could not agree on military requirements , strategies, or con-
cepts. Of course, the relative influence of the military or
Defense view in the National Security Council was ailuted by
20lack of a single position.
Notwithstanding the accomplishments of the National
Military Establishment under the initial legislative pro-
vision, many organizational deficiencies are apparent and
can be clearly associated with violations of the basic
principles of organization. The Secretary of Defense was
not provided all the means necessary and proper for the per-
formance of his responsibilities. It is questionable whether
his authority was greater than that of subordinate Service
Secretaries to whom he had to delegate responsibility.
Certain responsibilities were shared by the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Service secre-
taries. Certainly, obligations were not performed by
20
' A somewhat different approach to this issue is made
by Kintner, op. cit ., p. 32.
••
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subordinate Service Secretaries exactly as conceived by the
Secretary of Defense. In such an organization the need for
effective horizontal coordination was great.
Where horizontal coordination failed in the organisa-
tion, a single common principal could not be called upon to
resolve differences* The discharge of many responsibilities
was dependent upon the proper performance of duty by persons
with conflicting-—service-oriented—views. The individual
Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs were delegated re-
sponsibilities by more than one principal* The res^r^ed re-
sponsibilities of the Secretary of Defense exceeded the
capacity of his staff organization. The effective span of
control of the Secretary of Defense was exceeded. This was
evidenced by the fact that six individual subordinates and
four primary subordinate groups reported directly to him.
The human relationships dictated by the organiza-
tional structure were extremely complex. Delegated respon-
sibilities and service functions were not precisely defined.
The reserved and the delegated responsibilities of the
Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries were not
mutually exclusive. Supervision of the Service Secretaries
was not reserved to one delegant of responsibility. Group
responsibilities were resorted to in the extreme, with
attendant reduction in efficiency. Group members did not
have a common principal.

28
Two essentials of effective military action, a high
order of morale and a unity of doctrine, were not to be
found in the Defense organization* Military morale was re-
duced due to lack of confidence in the organisational struc-
ture* Unity of doctrine, with respect to strategy, tactics,
and procedural practice, was completely absent. No frame-
work existed for doctrinal enforcement*
In short, the National Security Council did not pro-
vide any discernible national security objectives, the form
of the National Defense Establishment violated almost every
basic principle of organization, and two vital requirements
of effective military organization were not achieved* Only
in the common purpose of the group members, to provide for
the survival of the United States in the event of war, could
any basis for improvement be found*
Amendments of 1949 * In recognition of certain defects
in the Defense organization, upon the advice and recommenda-
tions of the Commission on Organization of the Executive
21Branch, and incident to the findings of a special task
22force set up to study the national security organization,
the President, on March 5, 1949, requested the Congress to
The Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch was headed by Mr* Herbert Hoover and is often re-










consider a plan for D*fmn*G reorganisation. After con-
siderable Congressional debate, and despite unfavorable
testimony by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Congress passed
the reorganization legislation on August 2, 1949*
The 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act were
designed to change the basic nature of the Defense organisa-
tion, to increase the authority of the Secretary of Defense,
and to modify the structure, functions, and authorities of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff* Specifically, the legislation
provided: that the National Military Establishment would
become the Department of Defense} that the services would be
24demoted to military departments; that the word "general"
would bfe eliminated in describing the authority of the
Secretary of Defense j and that the Secretary alone would
represent the Department, as a member of the National Se-
curity Council* The services could no longer appeal Issues
to the President and the Bureau of the Budget* The Secretary
of Defense was granted authority to trfUiBfmr responsibility
for noncombatant functions, subject to Congressional veto*
Three Assistant Secretaries of Defense and a Deputy Secretary
23The development of this plan is rather well described
by Stanley, op * clt *, p* 90*
24The National Security Act of 1947 provided the
Secretary of Defense "general authority, direction, and con-
trol" over the three military departments*
-'j\i asw nimlif
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of Defense were provided. The Amendmenta also raised the
restriction on the number of officers serving on the Joint
Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 100 to 210 officers*
Title IV was added to the national Security Act and provided
a Q*f*na% Comptroller, comptrollership for each of the serv-
ices, and certain unified budgetary and fiscal procedures
25for the Department of Dafenae* (See Chart 9, p. 31.)
The legislation still provided that the services were
to be "separately administered, " and it gave specific au-
thority to the services to make recommendations to the Con-
gress after informing the Secretary of Q*fmnB*m The Con-
gress considered these provisions necessary to the
preservation of separate services and to the maintenance of
legislative information sources on the defense posture*
The events that followed do not indicate that the
basic ills of the organisation had h^en corrected* Dis-
tressing military reverses in Korea, the KacArthur hearings,
Congressional debate on "balanced forces," and criticism of
waste in the Department of Bmfenme were adequate evidence
that additional reorganization was required* What of the
principles of organisation? The violations of principle
inherent in the basic Act were not corrected by the
25
For a complete discussion of Title IV of the
National Security Act of 1947, see Kintner, op. cit . , p* 39;















































Chart 3. Department of Dsfenae—1949
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Amendments; however, in many cases, the degree of violation
was reduced* Unfortunately, a new problem was created*
Time was to prove that the addition of a Deputy
Secretary of Defense, three Assistant Secretaries, and a
Defense Comptroller imposed another layer of civilian con-
trol between the military and the Secretary of Defense* Had
the new staffing been used to assist the Secretary of De-
fense in the performance of his reserved responsibilities, a
violation of principle would not have developed* This layer
of civilian control, however, acted not as a staff, but as
an additional hierarchy of principals* This situation
merely producer dual lines of authority and additional split
responsibilities* In particular, the Defense Comptroller
exercised authority and made budgetary decisions beyond any
acceptable limit usually imposed on such a staff official*
This was, in part, due to the inability of the many joint
groups to reach agreement on major issues involving service
positions* The Amendments did not correct any basic defects
in the organisational structure but in some cases relieved
certain symptoms of the basic ills*
Reorganization Plan of 1953 * After the change of ad-
ministration, President Elsenhower appointed the Rockefeller
Committee to examine the organisation of the Department of
Defense* On April 11, 1953, the committee reported its
recommendations for reorganisation* These recommendations
N',;-','-
-
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were approved by the President , forwarded to the Congress,
and enacted into law on June 30, 1953*
Reorganisation Plan No* 6 of 1953 was designed to
provide greater management flexibility to the Secretary of
Defense. Specifically , it provided i that no function of
the Department of Defense was independent of the authority
of the Secretary of Defense; that the Service Secretaries
were "operating managers" for the Secretary of Qefqxiami and
that the Secretary of Defense would delegate responsibility
for the support of unified commands to the Service Secre-
26taries* Six additional Assistant Secretaries of Q^twiM
and a General Counsel were authorized, and the Munitions
Board c id the Research and Development Board were eliminated*
(See Chart 10, p* 34*
)
The plan further provided that performance reports on
military officers serving in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense were to be prepared by civilian superiors* The
Joint Chiefs of staff organisation was to restrict its ac-
tivities to planning and advising* In performing this func-
tion, the Chairman was to supervise the Joint Staff and select
27its members*
26Prior procedure was for the Joint Chiefs to dele-
gate such responsibility to one of their members*
27












































Chart 10. Department of Defense—1953
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What of the principles of organisation. The plan did
eliminate one dual line of scalar authority by requiring
that delegations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff pass via the
Secretary of Defense to the Service Secretaries* However,
with seven appointees added to the layer of civilian control,
many additional lines of authority, responsibility, control,
and supervision were to rear their ugly heads* The prin-
ciple that "policy direction should be centralised, but that
executive responsibility and administrative supervision
should be delegated to the lowest level capable of perform-
23ing the task" was flagrantly violated* The ineffective
system of delegation responsibility to boards and committees
was corrected, to a degree* The plan did not eliminate the
basic organisational defects which were inherent in the
29
structure provided by the National Security Act*
Reorganization Act of 1958 * President Eisenhower be-
came increasingly convinced that additional reorganization of
the Department of Defense was necessary* In his message to
Congress, on April 3, 1958, he expressed the conviction that
the authority of the Secretary of Defense was Insufficient,
James D. Mooney, The Principles of Organization
(second edition; Mew York: Harper and( BroEhers, 1947) p. 67.
29
For a full treatment , see International Security—-
tS. Military Aspect . Special Studies Report II of Rockefellerothers Fund (Garden City, Hew York* Doubleday, 1958),
p. 30*






that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have more responsi-
bility, and that the status of the unified commands should
30be raised. A proposal was drafted, submitted to the Con-
gress, and after extensive debate, enacted into law on
August 8, 1958* This most comprehensive military organiza-
tional reform was to become effective six months later*
Thus, the Defense Reorganisation Act of 1958 is the latest
legislation governing the structure and administration of
31the Armed Forces*
The specific provisions of the Act can best be de-
lineated if considered with respect to the authority of the
Secretary of DmfenBG, the responsibilities of the Joint
Chief t of Staff, and the role of the military departments.
The Act committed the Secretary of Defense, personally, to
direct and command the combatant forces* The line of com-
mand was to run from the President, to the Secretary of
Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, finally, to
the unified and specified commands. The number of Assist-
ant Secretaries of Defense was reduced from nine to seven,
These convictions are fully discussed by Ace L*
Waters and Jack L* Roger, "The Reorganization of the Depart-
ment of Defense," Armor . LXVTII, January-February 1959, p* 17*
The entire Act is discussed in U*S* Department of
the Navy, Reorganisation Act of 1958 , Public Law 85-S99
(Newport: tt.s* Naval War College, 1959), p# 2.




although a new position of Director of Defense Research and
Engineering was established* (See Chart 11, p. 38.) The
authority of the Assistant Secretaries to issue orders to
the services was restricted and detailed procedures for the
issuance of such orders were established*
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorised to organise
33
tht Joint Staff along conventional staff lines and to
34
eliminate the joint committee system. The military mem-
bership of the Joint Staff was increased from 210 to 400
officers* The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was to
assume much of the responsibility previously assigned to the
services as executive agents* To provide the members more
time J or staff matters, they were authorised to delegate
extensive service responsibility to their Vice Chiefs of
Staff* The creation of a single Chief of Staff or General
Staff was specifically prohibited* The "no vote" rule was
eliminated with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. 35
The Army has traditionally preferred the conven-
tional staff organisation—Gl , G2 t 03, etc*
34For a discussion of the joint committee, see U.S.
Department of Defense. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The Joint Secretariat (Washington s U.S. Department of
defense, 1956), p. £.
35This change was of little importance, as the Joint
























































Chart 11, Department of Dei cm.' e—1956
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The military departments were to be "separately or-
ganized," but not "separately administered* " The designa-
tion of military departments as executive agents of unified
and specified commands was discontinued on a phase-out basis*
The service chiefs were restricted to the supervision
,
rather than the command, of service components* The serv-
ices y/ere reduced to administrative, training, and logistic
36forces* This was the heritage of the - lsenhower adminis-
tration*
Recent Organisational Changes * The change of admin-
istration in January 1961 precipitated no alterations of
Defense structure that required legislative action* To date,
organisational changes have been restricted to those that
could be implemented by the authority vested in the Presi-
37dent* The Kennedy administration did adopt policies that
had a marked affect on both the military posture of the
united States and the human relationships within the
For more information on the new role of the mili-
tary departments, see U*3. Department of Defense, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Functions of the Department of
Defense and Major Components (Washington : ' U.S. Department
of Defense, December 31, 1958), p* 4} and Waters, op * clt*.
p. 17*
37The changes made, together with the broader issue
of the organization for national security, were reviewed by
a Senate subcommittee established in Kay 1962* See U.S* Con-
gress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Sub-
committee on National Security Staffing and Operations,
Administration of National Security (Washington: Government






Department of Defense* The organisational changes are more
germane to the subject of this chapter*
The first structural modification was to affect the
military intelligence community. The Defense Intelligence
Agency was created to coordinate all Defense intelligence
ID
activity. The Director of Defense Intelligence reports
39directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff* The arguments
favoring a centralised Defense Intelli ence Agency are
strong ones and are based upon the allegation that a service
produces intelligence reports that enhance the relative
40Importance of that service's role.
The second change was to place all civil defense
functions under the Secretary of Defense* One of the au-
thorised Assistant Secretary of Defense billets was utilised
for this purpose* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
33
For a discussion of the commissioning of the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, see U.S. Congress* Ssnat
Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National
olicy Machinery, Organization f





The functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency
are described in ibid ., p. 1222*
40The problem of coordinating the activities of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence
Agency has been a major issue. After the Cuban invasion,
consideration was given to creation of the post of Director
of National Intelligence* See Andrew Tully, Central
Intelligence Agency—The Inside 3tory (New York: William
Morrow and Company, 1^62), p. 14*
I.
41
Civil Defense now directs the nation-wide civil defense and
post-attack recovery programs*
Many of the basic defects in the Defense organization
were corrected by the various amendments to the National
Security Act* Still other defects were obscured by regula—
41tlons that relieved only the symptoms of the basic ills.
With this in mind and with this examination of the Defense
organization as a foundation, attention can be turned to the
politico-military policy units that function within, and
depend upon, the structure described*
41Senator Henry M» Jackson has stated that difficult
problems remain throughout the entire organization for
national security and that these may hampe t and
effective action* See U*S* Congress, Administration of
National Security , op * clt *» p. III.

CHAPTER III
POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS IN A MILITARY DEPARTMENT
Today the pen and the sword are more inter-
dependent than ever before in the formation and
execution of national policy* The p%na of naval
and military officers provide advice and counsel
to the civilians who fashion and direct the use
of the sword .i
In examining politico-military \ olicy formulation in
the Department of Defense, it is essential to consider in
detail the organization, functions, and procedures of each
unit in the Defense policy machine. For a full understand-
ing of the policy process, it is equally important to
determine the formal and informal relationships that exist
between the several units and the principal nuances of each
unit as it impinges upon the whole. Such is the task of the
next three chapters.
It is well at this point to delineate those units and
to delimit the organizational elements that will be asso-
ciated with each* The politico-military policy apparatus in
the Department of Defense is considered to encompass the
following principal units: the Office of International
The chapter title quotation is taken from an excel-
lent article on the importance of training large number of
officers in the field of international relations. See
George Hagerman, "The Navy's Politico-Military Program.
"
SXS« Naval Institute Proceedings . LXXXIX, November 1963
»
p.~*44.





Security Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint
Staff Directorate of Plans and Policy, and the politico-
military policy divisions of the military departments* In
any organization, policy decisions properly result, at least
in part, from a consideration of policy recommendations
which are generated within the organisational structure and
2flow vertically up the scalar chain. For this reason, it
is considered appropriate to so order this examination of
Defense politico-military policy units*
This chapter will relate the organization, functions,
and procedures associated with politico-military policy
formulation in the Department of the Navy* As almost iden-
tical policy structures and methods of policy formulation
are employed in the three military departments, the validity
of this study is not considered to be seriously compromised
by limiting detailed examination to a single military de-
partment. Quite naturally, the author selected the Depart-
ment of the Navy, where research could be facilitated by
past experience and personal contact.
Organizational Overview—Department of the Naw *
Prior to any detailed consideration of politico-military
2For an interesting treatment of the more significant
facets of policy formulation, not relating specifically to
politico-military policy, see Franklin Metzner, "The Formu-
lation of Policy in Military Affairs," U«j5. Naval Institute
Proceedings
.




policy formulation in the Department of the Navy, it is
necessary to conduct an abbreviated examination of the
structure which contains the policy unit and within which it
must function* This task Is somewhat complicated by the
fact that the Department is now in the process of implement-
ing a plan of substantial reorganisation* Such reorganiza-
tion was precipitated by an extensive management study
directed by Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth and concluded
in December 1962* The discussion here is based upon the
structure envisioned by the architects of that reorganiza-
tion plan*
The Defense chain of command, for purposes other than
4the operational direction of unified and specified commands,
runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and then
5to the secretaries of the military departments* The Secre-
tary of the Navy commands only the Naval and Marine forces
that are not assigned to unified and specified commands
j
3For a discussion of this management study, see Fred
Korth, "The Challenge to Navy Management," £«£• Naval
Institute Proceedings « LXXXIX, August 1963,~p7 26.
4The unified and specified commands are commanded by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
5U.S* Department of Defense , Office of the Secretary
of Defense , Functions of the Department of Defense and Major
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however, he is responsible for the preparation, training,
6
and equipping of all Naval and Marine forces*
To accomplish the coraaand and support tasks assigned
to the Secretary of the Navy, the Department of the Navy has
adopted a bi-linear scheme of organization* The Secretary,
7
assisted by a secretarial staff, exercises command of the
operating forces through the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps* Material support re-
quirements are determined by the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, approved by the
Secretary, and provided by the several Bureaus of the De-
partment. (See Chart 12, p* 46 and Chart 13, p* 47*)
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations * The Chief
of Naval Operations, presently Admiral David L* McDonald, is
assisted in the exercise of command by the Vice Chief of
Q
Naval Operations, now Admiral c. V. Ricketts* The Office
e
This oversimplification is sufficiently accurate for
the purpose of this overview*
7
This staff Includes many administrative elements in
the Executive Office of the Secretary and the undersecretary,
the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, the
Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics, the
Assistant Secretary for Finance, and the Administrative
Assistant*
8The Bureaus include Supers, BuMED, and, under the
Chief of Naval Material, BuWEPS, BuSHIPS, BuSandA, and
BuDOCKS.
9
For an interesting analysis of the role of the Chief
.•
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Chart 12* Armed Forces Chain of Coaaand (Simplified)




































of the Chief of Naval Operations is staffed by a large man-
agement body under the direction of six deputy chiefs and
three assistant chiefs. (See Chart 14, p. 49*
)
A key deputy is Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy. His
role and the role of the Vice Chief were greatly enhanced by
the Defense Reorganization Act of 195S. Since the Act
provided that the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume responsibility
for command of the unified and specified commands, they were
authorised to delegate extensive service responsibilities to
their vice chiefs. To assist in the performance of Joint
Chiefs of Staff functions, each Chief designated an opera-
tions deputy. Thus, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Plans and Policy performs collateral duties as operations
deputy to the Chief of Naval Operations. This affords him a
more direct organizational link with the Joint Staff than is
enjoyed by the other deputy and assistant chiefs.
olltlco-Kilitary Policy Division . The Deputy Chief
of Naval operations for Plans and Policy is assisted in the
performance of his staff responsibilities by an Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations in the grade of rear admiral. The
of Naval operations, see Hanson w. Baldwin, "CNO--Past,
Present, and—Future
.
M U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ,
CXXXIX, August 1963, p."~37.
1Qtr.S. Department of the Navy, Reorganization Act of
1958
.
Public Law 85-599 (Newport: U.S. Naval War College,
1959)
,
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Oi:ice of Plans and Policy Is organised to encompass five
divisions as follows: War Gaming Division, Foreign Military
Assistance Division, Pan American Affairs-—Naval Missions
and Advisory Groups Division, Politico-Military Policy Divi-
sion, and Strategic Plans Division* (See Chart 15, p. 51*)
Sach division is headed by a director in the grade of rear
admiral*
Rear Admiral Richard s. Craighill is presently
Director of the Politico-Military Policy Division. He has
an Assistant Director in the grade of captain a Special
Assistant for Political Matters in the grade of fso-4. This
foreign service officer acts in an exchange capacity and Is
not a liaison officer from the Department of State*
The Division is organised with four regional branches
and two functional branches, as follows: Africa, Middle
East, and South Asia Branch! Pacific and Far East Branch;
Western Hemisphere Branch; Europe and NATO Branch; Policy
Coordination, Diplomatic Clearance, and International Avia-
tion Branch; and Arms Control, Russian study, and United
In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery, Secretary of Defense Robert S*
McNamara explained the status of exchange officers from the
Department of State* There are eleven such exchange offi-
cers assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and the service staffs* See U.3* Congress,
Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery, Organizing for National Security-
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Nation* Branch. (See Chart 16, p. 53.) Each branch is
headed by an officer in the grade of captain and has from
two to four other officers assigned.
There are twenty-two officer billets in the Politico-
Military Policy Division, plus the one exchange billet.
Civil Service and enlisted personnel are restricted to
clerical assignments. Assigned officers are qualified to
perform policy formulation tasks by reason of experience and
training* A majority of the officers detailed to such duty
by the Bureau of Naval Personnel are service college or
National War College graduates and many have been exposed to
additional professional postgraduate training in inter-
national relations*
Functions of the Politico-Military Policy Division .
Having examined the organizational structure for politico-
military policy formulation in the Department of the Navy,
It is appropriate to turn to the functions of the Politico-
Military Policy Division. There is no written charter or
unclassified directive to describe such functions. The
Division, like most military staff elements, is not part of
the scalar chain of command and has no authority of Its own.
It performs services of advice and counsel as well as desig-
nated tasks in the areas of policy planning, interpreting,
and support. In short, the Division performs those functions
el Hon,-, (.£« .q ,*X SiaAD *,. *a *aclJmK
sj&ti fen* i
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which the Chief of Naval Operations would undertake himself
if time permitted*
Many tasks are specifically assigned to the Division
12
and others must be derived within the Division itself.*
Assigned tasks are associated with political annexes to
operation plans, strategic estimates, base rights, military
assistance, status of forces, training missions, operating
rights, alliance commitments, arms control, international
military cooperation, etc. Prom a discussion of the nature
of specific tasks and an examination of the organ 1-Rational
structure, certain insight into the functions of the Divi-
sion can be gained.
The Division must develop, coordinate, and recommend
politico-military policy positions for consideration by the
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations.
When the positions involve Issues of such importance that
they must be taken above the Department for decision, the
Division is called upon to monitor the process of considera-
tion and decision and to interpret the resultant directives.
Once decisions are made, it falls to the Division to prepare
implementing directives for the guidance of the entire Naval
Establishment and to monitor and evaluate the administration
12Derived tasks are a function of the nature of
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and management of approved policies and programs* To per-
form these functions, the Division must determine, through
continuous study of the world situation, the current prob-
lems of significance in naval operations and analyze the
range of possible politico-military actions.
Horizontal Coordination . The need for effective
13horizontal coordination becomes readily apparent upon
examination of the specific tasks and the functional areas
involved in politico-military affairs* Politico-military
policy must Interact with foreign policy to form the major
portion of national security policy* Therefore, close co-
ordination between those responsible for policy formulation
in the Department of Defense and the Department of State is
essential at all levels* To facilitate contact with the
Department of State, the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs was estab-
15llshed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in April 1961*
This office is the primary point of contact for the military
departments*
13Coordination is the orderly arrangement of group
effort to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common
purpose* See James D* Mooney, The Principles of Organiza-
tion (second edition} New York* Harper and Brothers, 1947),
p* 5*
14See testimony of Hon. Dean Rusk in U.S. Congress,
£| ! •.sii-.y fig National JegttrltV—Hear ings , «&« cit . , p. 1282,
15Politico-military posts have also hemn established
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Informal horizontal coordination takes place between
the several policy units in the Department of Defense and is
not dependent upon similar positions in the hierarchy* For
the Politico-Military Policy Division, coordination with the
Office of International Security Affairs and the Plans and
Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff is facilitated by the
assignment of senior naval officers to billets in both of
those organizations.
Many policy issues involve more than one of the serv-
ices; therefore, the officers of the Politico-Military
Policy Division maintain contact with contemporaries in the
politico-military policy agencies of the Army and the Air
Force. Marine Corps politico-military policy is not as in-
dependent a force, due to a common service secretary with
the Navy j however, the Navy does effect liaison with the
small G-3 Policy Plans Section in Marine Corps Headquarters
on matters directly affecting the Corps*
Within the Navy Office of Plans and Policy, politico-
military policy considerations are not confined strictly to
the Politico-Military Policy Division* Horizontal coordina-
tion with the foreign Military Assistance Division, the Pan
American Affairs—Naval Missions and Advisory Groups Divi-
sion, and the Strategic Plans Division is essential to the
proper formulation of many policy positions. Finally, it is
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all major decisions in a contemporary military establishment.
It has been estimated that there are a minimum of five thou-
sand naval officers in joinc billets or Navy billets that
directly, if not exclusively, involve politico-militau
16
affairs. The fact that many critical policy problems must
be treated on an ad hoc basis complicates the already com-
plex problem of horizontal coordination on politico-military
policy formulation* (See Chart 17, p. 58*)
Polltlco-Kllltary Channels * Policy decisions can be
divided roughly into two groups—those that can be reached
within the Department of the Navy, and those that must be
considered by the Secretary of Defense* The first group in-
volves matters affecting only the Naval Establishment and
lor which the Department of Defense has provided guidance to
limit the range of acceptable politico-military action* The
second group involves changes in basic Defense policy, mat-
ters affecting more than one service, or issues of such
importance that decisions fall beyond the prescribed or im-
plied a thority of the Secretary of Defense* The latter
group may be considered as Navy politico-military positions
on Defense politico-military policies* It is to this
critical segment of policy that attention is now directed*
zm the Politico-Military Policy Division is an
Hagerman, op * cit * , p. 45.
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eleiuent of the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, all
positions referred to higher authority must of necessity
conform to the desires of the Chief* Now the matter of ac-
cess becomes Involved* The Chief of Naval Operations is a
member of the Joint Chiefs of staff and he has direct access
to the Secretary of the Navy* as senior naval adviser to
the Secretary of Defense and the President, he has legal
access directly to those greater luminaries* This privilege
Is very seldom exercised*
The Politico-Hilitary Policy Division ders that
three channels are available to it in advancing the Navy
position* (See Chart 18, p* 60*} The channel selected is a
function of the nature of the policy issue involved and of
the difficulty expected in gaining favorable consideration
of the Navy position*
The first channel flows from the Chief of Naval
Operations, through the Secretary of the Navy and the Assist-
ant ecretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
to the Secretary of Defense* This is the channel used to
advance policy positions that involve only the Naval service
and that are expected to be favorably endorsed by the Office
of International Security Affairs* If it is expected that
the endorsement of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs may not be favorable, and if































Channels of Navy Politico-Military Policy Process

6'
importance to the Naval establishment, he may take the Navy
position directly to the Secretary of Defense* The use of
this second channel is usually limited to Issues involving
only the Naval service, of course, the Secretary of Defense
may well refer the Navy position to the Office of Inter-
national Security Affairs for comment, but the strength of
the position will already have been enhanced by virtue of
the importance given it by the Secretary of the Navy.
On matters involving more than one service, the Chief
of Naval Operations is expected to take the Navy position to
17the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There the issue will be staffed
by the Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff, con-
sidered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and forwarded, with
recommendations, to the Secretary of Defense. Again, the
Secretary of Defense may refer the matter to the Office of
International Security Affairs for comment.
It must be understood that the three normal channels
can be violated or used in combination when the Navy feels
strongly about a position taken. For example, the Chief of
Naval Operations may forward a matter through the Secretary
of the Navy and, if the Chief expects the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to add strength to the Navy position, also try for a
17The Chief of Naval Operations will normally have
positions "blessed" by the Secretary of the Navy befo,
taking them to the Joint Chiefs of Jtaff
•
. .




Joint Chiefs* endorsement* As a last resort, the Chief of
Naval Operations may, under the authority of the National
Security Act ol 1947, go directly to the Secretary of
Defense, the President, and even the Congress. In the lat*
two cases, he is required to advise the Secretary of Defense
of his intended actions.
Summary . Politico-military policy formulation in the
Department of the Navy is considered to be representative of
that to be found in each of the military departments. The
policy unit is located among the staff elements of the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations . It is staffed almost en-
tirely by Naval officers who exercise no line authority, it
functions to formulate the Navy politico-military policy
positions which the Chief of Naval Operations can advance
through the many channels open to him. As the responsibility
for politico-military policy formulation is not reserved to
any one policy un~
;
need for effective horizontal coor-
dination exists.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a profound impact on
politico-military policy decisions in the Department of










POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS IN THE JOINT STAFF
The Joint Chiefs of Staff occupy a unique position
with relation to the Secretary of Defense, the President,
the National Security Council, and the Congress. Much of
the historic development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
their Joint Staff was related in Chapter II. During much of
that history, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appear to have exer-
cised a greater influence on the national security policy of
the United States than any other agency of the Government,
2
excepting only the President himself. The position and in-
fluence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff become well enmeshed in
any discussion of civilian supremacy or Defense reorganiza-
tion. The burden of examining such issues will be held in
abeyance until a proper foundation for reflection can be
laid. To this end, it is now appropriate to examine in
For a discussion of the divided responsibility of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the executive and legislative
branches, see Maxwell Davenport Taylor, The Uncertain Trum-
pet (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959)
,
p. 111.
2In this regard, it is pertinent to observe that
during the early months of the Kennedy administration con-
fusion developed as a result of a lack of tight staff work.
General Maxwell D. Taylor was appointed to the post of Mili-
tary Adviser to the President, with responsibility for mili-
tary aspects of policy formulation. For a discussion of his
influence on policy decisions during that period, and later
as JCS Chairman, see "Big Change at the White House," U.jS.









detail the organisation, functions, and procedures for
politico-military policy femulation of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and their supporting Joint Staff*
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , The Joint
Chiefs of staff fall in the line chain of command between
the Secretary of Defense and the several unified and speci-
fied commands* Such commands encompass the bulk of the
combatant forces of the United States* In their staff ca-
pacity, the Joint Chiefs of Staff constitute the Immediate
military staff of the Secretary of Defense and act as the
principal military advisers to the President, the National
Security Council, and the Secretary of Omfmvut*
Many structural elements are associated directly with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff* The Chairman, now General Maxwell
D. Taylor, is personally aided in the performance of his
duties by a battery of military, executive, and administra-
tlve assistants, a* well as by the Chairman's Staff Group*
The balance of the corporate body consists of the Chief of
Staff, U*S« Army, General K* 3* Wheeler; the Chief of Naval
U*s. Department of &*£&cmm f Office of the Secretary
of Defense , Functions of tfr .fienfc /ise and Major
Components ( Washington t U*&* Department of Def'ens'e, Decem-
ber 31, 1953), p. 4.
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
p. 19*







Operations, Admiral David L. McDonald; and the Chief of
Staff 9 U*S* Air Force, General Curtis E. LeMay* The Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace M* Greene v Jr.,
has co-equ 1 status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on matters which directly concern the Marine
Each of the service chiefs is assisted in the discharge otf
his Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibilities by an operations
deputy from his own service staff* The Defense Atomic Sup**
port Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Joint Strategic Survey council, a
the U.S. Representative to the Military Committee and Stand-
ing Group JIATC come directly under the supervision of the
Joint Chiefs* (See Chart 19, p. 66* >
Organisation of the Joint staff . Staff support for
the Joint Chiefs is provided by the Joint Staff under the
Director of the Joint Staff* This billet has been rotated
among the senior services and is presently filled by Vice
Admiral Herbert *J.ley* A Vice Director and a Deputy
Director are assigned from two—star ranks of the other two
services, imdet the Director of the Joint staff are a
myriad of groups, boards, councils, agencies, command cen-
ters, and special assistants 5 however, the principal staff
work of the Joint Staff is conducted by the five directorates*
The directorates are identified by their functional
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rations Directorate? J~4, Logistics Directorate ; J-5,
Plans and Policy Directorate j and J-6, Communicatlons—
Electronics Directorate* (See Chart 20, p* 68•) The J-2
designation does not appear; it would normally be the intel-
ligence element of the staff* On the Joint Staff, intelli-
gence support is provided by the DmfmuQ Intelligence Agency,
which has already h^en discussed in Chapter II.
The Joint staff is manned by some four hundred offi-
m
cers of the four services, most of whom are in the senior
grades—commander or lieutenant colonel and above* Almost
all officers assigned to the Joint Staff are graduates o£
the national war College, one of the service colleges, or
6
the Armed Forces Staff College* All have a wide range of
operational experience*
Tfre Plans and, Policy Directorate^ The politico-
military policy unit of the Joint Staff is contained in the
structure of the Plans and I ollcy Directorate* The Director
of I lans and Policy is normally a two-star officer, pres-
ently Major General Paul S. Earlex, I a* Two
deputy directors of flag or general grade are provided from
\& limitation on the number of officers on the
staff . tablished by the Reorganisation Act of 19b
is expected that the Secretary of Defense will soon request
the limitation raised to 1,000 officers*
£
The National War College and the Armed Forces staff




















NATIONAL MILITARY COMMA ID CENTER, ALTERNATE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAMD CENTER, NATIONAL AIRBORNE
EMERGENCY COMMAND POST, NATIONAL EMERGENCY COMMAND
POS'J AFLOAT, JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
GROUP, JOINT STAFF SECRETARY, JOINT WAR GAMES
AGENCY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR COUNTERINSURGFNCY AND
jjSPECIAL ACTIVITIES, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR MILITARY
ASSISTANCE AFFAIRS, MILITARY COMMUNICATION-
ELECTRONICS BOARD, JOINT METEOROLOGICAL GROUP,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ARMS CONTROL.
Chart 20. The Joint Staff (Simplified)
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the other service*. The Directorate encompasses six co-
equal divisions , each headed by a two-star officer* Four of
these divisions—Strategic Plans, special Studies, Require-
ments and Development, and Programs—are not primarily co
earned with politico-military policy formulation*
The two divisions responsible for politico-military
policy formulation are Regional Division One and Regional
Division Two* (See Chart 21, p» 70*) Regional Division
One, under Brigadier General 3* 0* Turnage, U.S* Army, en-
compasses three branches, each staffed by three or four
officers* There is a Worth American Branch, a Latin Ameri-
can Branch, and a Pacific—Southeast Asia Branch,
Regional Division Two is similarly organized under
Brigadier General C« &• Johnson, U*S* Army* Nine officers
are assigned to the large European Branch, two to the African
7
Branch, and two to the Middle East and South Asia Branch*




Neither the Director o* the Joint Staff nor any directorate
of the staff is in the line chain of command* The Joint
Staff only functions to extend the capacity of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who function as a corporate body. In the
7Staffing information was extrapolated from J
rosters and updated by interview* epartment of
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff , JS Roster (Washington* The
















































politico-military policy are*, the Joint Staff is specifi-
cally charged with providing staff support in matters of
National Security Council affairs, disarmament affairs, and
aforeign military assistance*
As was true in the case of the Department of the Navy,
politico-military policy formulation is not* and perhaps
Policy Directorate, however, is specifically charged with
responsibility for "making recommendations on strategic and
politico-military matters requiring action by the Joint
a
Chiefs of Staff* " The two regional divisions must prepare
recommendations on questions of policy regarding regional
't^^* ^jS wwMfce**Bif «^ni# *Riw**w m %™ ^eeeeme* ^^*w*^^» hrw™* *mpfw*«<p ^^m^ wwwww^wavv ^pwhf "t*—wnn* *<^ w'-^w^w^^p^^
participation in united Nations military activities, recom-
mend policies concerning the training and education of
members of the armed forces of other nations, provide as-
sistance in the drafting of military treaties and inter-
national agreements, and provide staff support on other
politico-military matters*
The functions delineated above are, of course, derived
For a slightly more detailed discussion of Joint
Staff functions, see U*s. Department of Defense, Organisation
SSI £&*&!&& SL JSi* iS&B* g&g£* o! Stafff, o£. cl£., P. 35.
9U.S. Department of ^f«»e» qrganlsMJ^nM fiBfir
lions o£ the Joint Chiefs o£ ffW*> ©£» £££.. P- *77
to art*.
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from the functional areas of responsibility assigned to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Acting in their staff capacity, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare and submit to the Secretary of
Detente guidance in the full range of politico-military
policy*
Politico-Military Policy Channels of the Joint Chiefs
of staff . Before examining the formal channels available to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is well to consider again the
matter of horizontal coordination* The diffusion of respon-
sibility for politico-military policy formulation in the
Department of Defense and the multiplicity of channels for
advancing policy positions dictate a need for continuous and
effective horizontal coordination between policy units*
Such horizontal coordination takes place in a manner almost
identical to that described when the politico-military
policy unit of the Department of the Navy was considered*
Suffice to say that such coordination is facilitated in the
case of the Joint Staff by the prestige position that ob-
tains and by the presence on the Joint Staff of military
officers from all the services*
Many formal channels for advancing policy positions
are available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (See Chart 22,
p* 73*} The privilege of direct access to the Secretary of




















Chart 22. Channel* of JCS Politico-Military Policy Process
.
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the Congress is provided for by law. The policy recommen-
dations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are normally forwarded
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs for coordination and endorsement* They
must then be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense* A
unanimous recommendation of the Chiefs will have a greater
12impact on the ultimate decision than will a "split paper •"
The unique relationship of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Dmf^uime does permit the Chairman
to exercise a considerable measure of direct influence on
13
matters of politico-military policy* The entire area of
civilian-military relationships will be explored in
10
Hon. Carl Vinson , Chairman of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee, has taken the position that only the JCS can
provide Congress with creditable military advice* See Fred
J* Cook, "Juggernauts The Warfare State,** Nation . CXCIII,
October 28, 1961, p* 283*
^There is no regulation to prevent ISA from rejact-
ing JCS recommendations* While ISA may not respect the
Judgments of the JCS, it does respect their prestige posi-
tion* Thus, ISA always forwards JCS p*pmr» 9 with endorse-
ment, to SECDEF.
12For a discussion of how weak papers result from
"backscretching " by the JCS, see "McNamara and His Critics,**
New Republic . CXLVIII, March 30, 1963, p* 5*
13
For a discussion of the successes of General Taylor
in pushing the "flexible response** doctrine, see "The General
Who Disagreed," 17,3* Stewa «xk World Report . H f July 10,
1962, p* 40* For a full explanation of the present Chair-
man's p*° * ico-«ilitary views, see Taylor, op * clt*. p* 107,
•4NNNM*« '' ' | Ml
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considerable detail as this study moves from the more mun-
dane area of factual foundation into the more interesting
area of analysis and recommendation*
Summary * The Plans and Policy Directorate of the
Joint Staff acts as the primary politico-military policy
formulation unit of the Joint c. iefs of Staff* The Joint
Chief
s
9 in their capacity as principal military advisers to
the President! the National Security Council , and the Secre-
tary of Defense, review the policy formulations of the Joint
Staff and the military departments* They then forward their
own recommendations via the multiple channels available to
them* It falls to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs to coordinate the politico-
military policy of the Department of Defense* An examina-
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CHAPTER V
OFFICE OF INTERHATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs is the principal staff assistant to the
Secretary of Defense in the pc iitico-military policy area*
Thus, the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) has
a tendency to overshadow all other policy units in the De-
2fense hierarchy* The detailed examination of this element
in the &*£*&*• politico-military machinery is vital to this
study of policy formulation in the Department of Defense*
The description of the evolution of the Department of
Defense, made in Chapter II, was based upon the various re-
organisation acts and resulted in a rather juridical chro-
nology* This method did not provide much background on the
Office of International Security Affairs, as the creation
and development of that Office has bmvn a simple administra-
tive device* A brief historical survey is, therefore, the
*U*S« Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy
us
For a full discussion of the importance of ISA, see
U*S* Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Subcommi on National Policy Machinery, Organisation for
^





first burden of this chapter* Thereafter, the organisation,
functions, and procedures of the Office will be explored*
Evolution of the Office of International Security
Affairs * Before the Department of Defense came into exist-
ence, politico-nllltary policy was formulated by the mili-
tary services* Coordination was, to a limited degree,
provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff* with the increased
importance of military aid and the postwar commitment of
United States forces to many foreign theaters, the role
played by the Department of Defense in foreign affairs ap-
peared to be a lasting one* At the request of the Secretary
of Defense, the President established the billet of Special
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs* This action was taken on December 19,
1950, by executive order of the President* Mr* Frank Hash
was appointed to the post*
The Office of International Security Affairs was as-
signed increasing responsibility for politico-military
policy formulation, military assistance coordination, and
National Security Council affairs* The hegemony of ISA was
not limited to the Departing c of Defense and its importance
was to be felt throughout the Government policy structure*
In February 1953 the Special Assistant was given the pres-
tige tlti.e of Assistant Secretary of Defense* His office
further increased its scope of activity and assumed
iv . i : t ..:;
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additional responsibility for coordinating policy formula-
tion in the Department of Defense*
As the Secretary of D^fmnsm delegated more and more
of his authority to the Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Security Affairs, ISA became a bone of contention in
the developing conflict over the expanding authority of the
Secretary of Defense vls-aVvis the service secretaries and
4
the chiefs of the military departments* Loss of control of
the military assistance programs was a primary issue* The
House Armed Services Committee reviewed the role of ISA in
I
1956, but the increasing authority of the Secretary of
Defense and his staff of assistant secretaries was not to be
arrested* Thus, ISA was born of unification, became a prin-
cipal concern in the struggle for power in the Department,
and survived to become a powerful politico-military policy
unit.
Organisation of the office of International Security
Affairs * The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
See William R* Kintner, Forging a New Sword (first
edition; New York! Harper and Brothers , xSRSs)
, p* 45*
A full examination of the conflict for power in the
Department was made by Timothy W* Stanley, American Defense
and National Security (first edition; Washington i Public
Affairs Prists , i^S6 ) , p* 45. During 1961, Mr. Stanley held
a post in ISA*
e
For U*<~ report, see U*S* Congress, House, Committee
on the Armed Forces, Investigation of national Defense .




Security Affairs directs an organisation of sons 325 civil-
ian and military personnel. About two-thirds of this fores
are In executive billets, half of which are filled by mili-
tary officers* This percentage of military officers exceeds
that of any of the other six assistant secretarial offices*
The Assistant Secretary*s immediate staff consists of
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, a small policy review staff, and support-
ing clerical personnel* The balance of the ISA staff Is
functionally organised under three deputy assistant secre-
taries and a director* (See Chart 23, p* 80*) The Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Planning and National Security
Council Affairs directs two elements—the Policy Planning
Staff, and the Coordinating Staff* Under the Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for Disarmament Is the Directorate for Dis-
armament and United Nations Affairs* The activities of
three directorates are coordinated by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Regional Affairs* They are the Directorate
for Military Rights, the Regional Directorate, and the
Directorate for Foreign Economic Affairs* (See Chart 24,
p. 81.)
6ISA is staffed by 110 civilian executives and 88
military officers* There are 125 civilian and 15 military
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The Director of Military Assistance, usually a four-
star officer, is assisted toy two deputy directors, one of
which is a military general or flag officer of two-star rank*
The Military Assistance Office is organised in five func-
tional divisions, as follows i Planning Division, Program-
ming Division, Weapons Production and Sales Division, Man-
power and Training Division, and the Military Assistance
Comptroller* (See Chart 25, p. 83*) The large majority ot
the personnel of ISA are assigned to regional affairs and
The one field office reports directly to the Assist-
ant Secretary* under a Defense representative, with head-
quarters in Paris, are several subordinate representatives*
They function in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle cast*
Security Affairs * There is little question about the nature
of the functions assigned to the Assistant Secretary* He is
to monitor Department of D^fmi^ participation in National
Security Council affairs, coordinate and recommend Defense
7policy positions, and provide politico-military staff
7
Hon* Thomas 5* Gates, Jr* described the coordination
function of ISA in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on National Policy Machinery* See U*3* Congress, Senate,
Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery, Organising for National Security—Hearings
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support for the Secretary of Defense. He also takes neces-
sary action to implement National Security Council decisions
In the Department of Q*fatiBm* He develops, coordinates,
and evaluates plans, procedures, and policies in the fields
Sj
of international politico-military affairs, foreign eco-
nomic affairs, disarmament, operating rights, status of
forces, and military assistance. To facilitate the execu-
tion of his responsibilities, commensurate authority has
been delegated to the Assistant Secretary* Me may issue
instructions to the Department of Defense that are appro-
priate to his field and can require reports or assistance
from the military departments or other Defense agencies. He
may request Joint Chiefs of Staff action or advice on mat-
ters in his assigned field of responsibility* These
authorities far exceed those normally delegated to members
of military staffs* Thus, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Security Affairs has become more than a staff
official and has assumed considerable line authority* The
exercise of lino authority by the several assistant
8
"NSC decisions** are really decisions of the President,
9ISA can issue directives to any element of the DOD.
"^ on U.S. Dep^tmont of Of*-, Th« A„l.tant
Secretary for International Security Affairs , op * c3.t .« p* 2*
HFhis authority was granted by V.S* Department of
Defense, The Assistant Secretary fo£ ^aterna^lona| Security







secretaries has been objectionable to the military depart-
ments and to many senior officers* It has been the basis of
many criticisms of the methods by which the Secretary of
D^taiB^ exercises his centralised authority*
Internal Relationships and Procedures * it is well to
examine briefly the relationships and procedures of the four
subordinate structures that assist the Assistant Secretary
in discharging his duty as principal staff assistant to the
Secretary of Defense in the functional field of interna-
tional security* The Deputy for Planning and H$C Affairs
has both planning and advisory functions to perform* The
planning function has been expanded since the National
Security Council Planning Board was disbanded by President
Kennedy* Under the present concept, NSC plans are staffed
by an assigned department of the executive branch and co-
ordinated with other departments by the assigned depert-
12
ment* This procedure is augmented by the use of special
task forces to develop plans for coping with crisis situa-
13
tions* The Deputy for Planning and NSC Affairs often
g*fcy~-»**rMg*> a- £&•» p. iznr
12
For a discussion of the special task force » see
U*S« Congress , Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Subcommittee on national Security Staffing and Operations,
frffiej^ttteft 2£,SS|i2S&l gffgUf.W (Washington* GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963), p* 3*





finds himself a key member of such task forces* His two
subordinate staffs have complex responsibilities. The
Policy Planning Staff formulates Defense positions on NSC
matters and tries to coordinate these with the Department of
14State, The Coordinating Staff is the implementing agency
for NSC decisions*
The Deputy for Disarmament and his Directorate for
Disarmament and united Nations Affairs act as a focal point
for coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
military departments on politico-military policy matters.
Notwithstanding the rather deceiving title, this office is
the source of military advice on all aspects of international
security affairs* In addition, it specifically formulates
Defense policies and positions on arms control and united
Nations matters* Horisontal coordination with the Policy
Planning Staff is essential to the injection of the purely
military view Into Defense positions*
The Deputy for Regional Affairs, through his Regional
Directorate, conducts a continuous study of the world situa-
tion and current international problems* Based on this study
he is supposed to advise the Assistant Secretary on the range
of possible politico-military actions in the several regions*
14
For a discussion of coordination with Jtate, see
U.S. congress, i^an^a^a for National Jecurl^y—Hearings,
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The Directorate for Foreign Military Rights formulates D*~
fmna* positions with respect to agreements with foreign
governments on military bases, status of forces, operating
rights, and exchange of atomic information* The Directorate
for Foreign Economic Affairs develops Defense positions
regarding foreign economic policies and programs*
The Directorate of Military Assistance will not be
examined in detail, as it is largely an implementing agency*
Xt does share in the formulation of military assistance
policy with the Deputy for Regional Affairs and the Deputy
for Disarmament* The Policy Review Staff, directly under
the Assistant Secretary, reviews the effectiveness of mili-
tary assistance and acts as the contact point with the
Department of State on such matters*
Summary * Analysis of the organization, functions,
authorities, and procedures of the Office of International
Security Affairs reveals that the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs is all-powerful
in influencing the politico-military policy positions of the
Department of Defense* His only channel for advancing
recommendations is direct to the Secretary of Qm£mxi»m» ISA
completely overshadows the policy units of the military
departments, both by reason of position in the structure and
by reason of a unique line authority*












however, ISA will almost elway& get e crack at any JCS posi-
tion, whether submitted directly to the Secretary of Defense
or via ISA* Split JCS papers are, of course, quite vulnera-
ble and enhance civilian participation in the policy formu-
lation process.
Having examined the Department of nrnfen*** in general,
and the politico-military policy units, in detail, attention
can now he turned to an evaluation of the entire structure*
-i
CHAPTER VI
DEFECTS IN THE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Ho theoretical study, no Intellectual attainments
on the part of laymen, can be a substitute for the
experience of having lived and delivered under the
stress of war*l
Examination of the evolution of the Department of
Defense and consideration of the several politico-military
policy units have established a foundation for reflection*
The task of this chapter is to evaluate the effectiveness of
the existing D^i^n^m organization, to identify and delineate
any significant structural defects, and to analyse the de-
fects in order to determine their basic causes*
As this study is concerned with politico-military
policy formulation In the Department of Defense, it might be
hoped that the effectiveness of the policy process and the
policy units could be examined in isolation* Such a method
is not possible* The policy units of the Department are
deeply enmeshed with the entire O^tmmm structure* As has
been related, these policy units are not the only vehicles
to politico-military policy formulation* In fact, all key
Defense officials and agencies participate in, or have an
T'his slap at "whis kids" was contained in General
Taylor «s address to the 1963 class at West Point* See









impact upon, the formulation of politico-military policy*
An associated obstacle to simple methods of analysis is the
fact that no clear line can be drawn between politico-
military policy and other areas of Defense policy* Thus, it
is apparent that this evaluation and analysis will have to
consider the entire Defense policy-making body and, there-
fore, the whole QmtmnBm organisation*
Evaluation of Organisational Sffectlvenoss » Any
attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the D^exi^e organi-
sation is plagued with many obstacles* The specific con-
tribution of each of the policy units to the ultimate
Defense positions cannot .v, determined, as the positions
themselves are highly classified* The impact of the Defense
positions on national security policy is equally hard to
measure for the same reason* Even the success of military
operations, the implementation stage, cannot properly be
evaluated because the objectives of such operations, and
even the courses of action themselves, are classified*
Some estimate of organizational effectiveness can,
however, be made by examining the reflection of effective-
ness in certain tangential areas* What do the key policy-
makers themselves think of the Defense organisation and the
policy decisions it generates? Not a few service secre-
taries have resigned their appointed posts as a result of
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positions* Many respected flag and general officers have
resigned in order to criticise the policy apparatus, and the
associated organisational structure of the Department, from
the relatively secure sanctuary of retirement. Such re*
spected figures as General Matthew B. Ridgway, General
4 5James M. Gavin, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Admiral Louis
E. Denfeld, and Admiral George Anderson have recommended
sweeping reorganisation. The testimony of creditable wit-
nesses before Congressional investigation committees is
7filled with references to "command by committee, split JCS
2Military officers with over twenty years of service
are placed on the retired list when their resignations are
accepted.
3See Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1956).
4See James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age
(New York: Harper and Brothers , 1958 } * Also R. Ernest""
Dupuy, "Should the U.S. Scrap the JCS System," Army—Navy--
Air Force Register . XXIX, December 21, 1957, p. 1
§See Maxwell Davenport Taylor , The Uncertain Trumpet
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959).
&See Louis E. Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," Collier's ,
CXXV, March 25, 1950, p. 32.
7SECDEF McNamara told a Senate committee how he uses
the committee system. See tJmS* Congress, Senate, Committee
on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Policy
Mach. aery, Organizing for National Security—-Hearings












8 9papers, revolt of the admirals, conflict of loyalties, end
billion-dollar blunders • "
The best yardstick for measuring Defense policy may
be the evaluation of Defense decisions by responsible com-
mandera in the operating forces* These are the men that
must assimilate the directives emanating from the Pentagon
and must implement policy decisions* The service journals
mr^ filled with criticisms of the Department of Defense*
Some officers have put their careers squarely on the line In
an effort to .tl^ulate corrective ttion. 10 Perhaps it 1,
too conservative to conclude simply that there exists, in
many quarters, considerable doubt as to the effectiveness of
the Department of Defense*
Defacts in the organisational Structure * Many of the
defects in the Q^fimMm organisation were corrected by the
amendments and reorganisations discussed in Chapter II*
Still other defects were obscured by regulations that re-
lieved only the symptoms of the basic ills* The most
significant of the remaining defects will first be delineated
then grouped for discussion*
For discussion, see Taylor, oj£* clt* p* 60*
General Taylor describes the conflict of loyalties
to service, self, the Department, and the Congress* See
Taylor, op . cit e , p* 94*
- *..
,*5* ^S1* ** ** ®' s * Congress, ^aanlsfoq lg£
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Roles, missions, tasks, functions, and responsibili-
ties are still not precisely defined*
Horizontal coordination is difficult due to con-
flicting responsibilities and service interests.
The effective span of control of the Secretary of
Defense is still exceeded* Fifteen key officials report
directly to the Secretary*
Reserved and delegated responsibilities are far front
mutually exclusive and supervision is not x^B^rv^d to the
delegant of responsibility* These issues were discussed
when the line authorities of the Assistant Secretary (ISA)
were examined*
Group responsibilities are still resorted to in the
extreme*
Military morale is still reduced by lack of confidence
in the organisation, and unity of doctrine has never been
evidenced*
Some of the above-listed defects require limited dis-
cussion* The Department of Defense has a definite and
proper role to play in the area of national security policy
and strategy determination* It must reflect the national
security policy, must advance one coordinated view on all
elements of national strategy end policy planning, and must
develop a sound strategic doctrine for the implementation
of selected courses of action*
m
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Military strategy properly produces military require-
ments. These requirements should be a function of the enemy
threat or the enemy'!; ability to counter one's own military
strategy, In fact, the X>mienBm budget is now based on a
compilation of service generated military requirements* To
support these requirements, the intelligence estimates of
each service tend to exaggerate the enemy threat to that
service's combatant elements, and each service advances
strategic concepts which enable it to claim the decisive
role in war*
while forces in being are a basic requirement in
readiness for contemporary war, a controlling administrative
and command system that is capable of rapid and sound decision-
making must also be provided* Political , economic, and
military factors must be constantly blended at the top, and
they must encompass a realistic reflection of both military
11
and civilian views.**
Military staffs, long responsible for the overall
direction, not control, of the Armed Forces, have been re-
placed by multiple layers of civilian secretarial control
and direction* Admittedly, this is, in part, due to the
* See discussion of this view in U*S* Congress.
Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery, Organijy^ *2£ ?»£*#»** fecM~rlty—Interim Report (Washington: Government Printing
MTtO
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inability of the services to agree even when their military
officers are granted proper positions in the directing
hierarchy. Department of Defense channels of communications
are clogged by a multiplicity of civilian staffs* Duplica-
tion of administrative effort and over staffing are con-
stantly in evidence* Indefinite , ill-considered , and
uncoordinated guidance has led to diverse interpretations of
directives | confusion in operations, and civilian-military
conflict*
A primary requirement of an efficient military or-
ganisation is the ability of that organisation to integrate
the weapons system develop cycle with strategic planning
and budgeting* Research and development should be sensitive
to strategic requirements* Too often, research and develop-
13
ment have dictated strategic concepts* The present system
of budgeting on a weapons system or functional basis has
produced a neglect of vital functions in the area of un-
contested service roles* Airlift, tactical air support, and
anti-submarine warfare are crying examples*
Other specific defects in the Department of Defense
12
* Tor a discussion of this point, see William It*
Kintner, org^ng a. Mew Swor^ <fir»t edition; Hew York*
Harper and Brothers7l958 ) , p. 62.
11See tee A* DuBridge, "Policy and Scientists, n








organization could be discussed and expanded to encompass
several volumes* The purpose here is to determine that
defects do exist, to identify the most significant ones, and
to determine their causes*
Reflection upon the nature of th*s defects described
readily precipitates the conclusion that each defect can be
traced to one or more of the following causes t violations
of the basic principles of organisation, civilian-nilitary
conflict in the top echelons of the department, and the
destructive aspect of inter-service rivalry* These three
basic causes will be analysed In detail in the next chapter.
With such analysis as a i ation, a plan for Defense re-
organization can be advanced* Such a plan should provide
for elimination of the causes of the significant defects
that are found in the existing Department of Defense organi-
sation*
hmm I •>?' .-..•- m . - j.
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AX1 too many would-be organisational artisans have
noted only the symptoms associated with certain basic ills
in the Department of D^fmi3% organisation* They have then
proposed revolutionary measures designed to relieve only
these symptoms. This study has identified the causes (ills)
behind the defects (symptoms)* Each cause will now be ex-
Basic Principles of Organisation * The development of
any reorganlsational plan must, of necessity , be preceded by
a consideration of the basic principles of organisation*
When such reorganisation involves a military organisation,
it is essential to consider certain additional principles
applicable to the military and to explore the fundamental
line and staff concept* Attention will first be given to
the basic principles which are applicable to any organisa-
tion*
Host human consciousness is devoted to wanting, and
the sum of such wanting represents man's purposes* Me de-
votes endeavor to the realisation of his purposes and in-
tends that the endeavor be effective* As most purposes
transcend the practicable accomplishments of individuals,
their execution depends upon concerted group action*
"* -
:
The simplest form of concerted action is represented
by ail group members performing the same task as a means to
the realization of a common purpose* Such random multipli-
cation of effort cannot amount alone to continuing endeavor*
Thus, the earmark of concerted endeavor is a differentiation
of roles enacted by group members* Organisation deals with
this differentiation of endeavor*
organisation is simply a process which, by differen-
tiation of individual endeavors , *ervn as a means to more
effective concerted endeavor* It defines the part which
each member of an enterprise is expected to perform and the
relations between such members* Since organisation can be
diverse and the effectiveness of the resultant endeavor
varied, man must seek out and understand the basic principles
of effective organisation* These principles can be induced
from man's long experience with organisation and deduced
from the very nature of the endeavors which engage man's
2
attention*
Organization is a means to administration (concerted
endeavor), and administration only the means to a purpose*
for a full discussion , see Alvin Brown, Organize-
§}Pf~^ g9g»¥}*^ffi S& ^foSigf* tfl*at edition* New VorkiHlbbert Printing company, 1945), p. 6*
2Albert ^P«wsky, The Art and Science, of organization














As a means, organization does not differ because it is put
to different uses by different groups of individuals*
Regardless of the purpose of the endeavors, the principles
of effective organisation always apply* The principles are
the sarae, whether applied to the organisation of the family,
the church, the school, the military, the state ( totali-
1
tarian or democratic), or to industry*
The three basic principles of organisation are the
coordinative principle, the scalar principle, and the func-
tional principle* These three basic principles will now be
discussed in some detail*
Coordination is the orderly arrangement of group ef-
fort to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common
purpose* It has its foundation in authority, or the su-
preme coordinating power* Mutuality of interest is a psychic
fundamental of coordination, but does not necessarily con-
stitute an identity of interest* The objectives of the
organisation and the procedures to attain these objectives
I
are defined by doctrine* Organised efficiency demands a
doctrine { but its efficient application demands, in turn, an
All except the school are discussed by Brown, op *
c li; * , p* 7 #
43ae James D* Mooney, The, j£M&£l&*L &£ Organisation(second edition; New York! Harper ana fathers, 1947}, p. 5*











organized discipline* This organised discipline encompasses
tooth imposed discipline and self-discipline on the part of
group Members.
A scale Is a series of steps* In organization, the
scalar process involves the grading of duties according to
degrees of authority and corresponding responsibility* This
process encompasses the elements of leadership , delegation,
and functional definition* Leadership is the form that
authority assumes when it enters into process* It must
project Itself through the entire scalar chain, until it
effectuates the formal coordination of the entire organisa-
tional structure* Delegation means the conferring of a
specified authority by a higher authority* Such delegation
involves a dual responsibility* The dele jant remains ul-
timately responsible, but the subordinate member becomes
responsible to him* At the top of the scalar chain, one
p^rBon has the supreme authority which makes him responsible
for the whole* Functional definition is the process by
which a superior delegate defined responsibilities to a sub-
ordinate, and it is the finality of the entire scalar
6process*
Punctionallsm in organization refers to functional
7differentiation between kinds of duties* Every duty
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involves either planning, performing, ox interpreting* More
familiar terms might be legislative, executive, end judicial*
The ideal of organised efficiency is the integrated correla-
tion of these three primary functions* Another kind of
functionalism, technical functlonallsm, is evidenced in the
highly diversified tasks of contemporary factory organisa-
tions* Their coordination can he effectuated only through
^pse^^ w^nsHi^ a* ^w^isa* *awM*<a* ^i»*s*%ssa ^("SV a* anes^^ ^Mav^snSA^p e m* TBPw^fe^^mssjsm*fc^^a»'«taMeif ^^<a»em^m e ep^s**wse> ^^ e
and duties* without such definition, friction will prevail
throughout the organisation*
With the basic principles of organisation as a founda-
••wapShS a *>% "*•* se^iF^e jMr^^4^sv4a*siP.4S*^V' anwiir ^e^ts*p**s*eem^^w*e^^ w*mp ^e^isa*a^i(apse>Te -a* ssa>4Mmmni^^mmosi
tals of effective organisation* Organisational structure
should be determined prior to the selection of personnel to
8
meet organisational requirements* The selection of person-
nel should then be based upon requirements established for
each bilU within the structure* The organisational process
should precede any embarkation upon endeavor* This situa-
tion constitutes the ideal, but application may be difficult
in very small organisations and in certain cases of reorgani-
sation*
Responsibility, with its inherent obligation and
authority, is created by delegation from one having a
The balance of this discussion is based entirely on
Brown, ofc. clt* * p* 72*
*,*©•! ft* M^H BUI* 1*iXlltt*
*feN*lA 4*f3»4*Mlft X***km ***** ***** *« ml*
*mv&mm% tumtmim* itm±t*m..
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greater responsibility* It inheres exclusively to the in-
10dividual and cannot be shared* The authority inherent in
a responsibility must include all means necessary and proper
for the performance of that responsibility* The perform-
ance of any obligation must be accomplished exactly as it is
12
conceived by the delegant of responsibility* An indivi-
dual having responsibilities which are dependent upon the
proper performance of tasks in another section of the scalar
chain should first attempt to rasolve deficiencies by hori-
zontal coordination and appropriate liaison* If such effort
case, no responsibility should have to depend for effective
13performance upon another which may have a contrary interest*
Only one member of an organisation should delegate
14
responsibility to a particular individual* In other words*
a person can only work for one direct boss* The delegant
^•^PBwn*w ™*• * T^m'• e**e»^*w *>•<#»^» *^>ifc *Ae> ^^^•••i^Hfc ^#^b*. *^ ee^mfci'^BFeeflm<ft*^ft'<^™<ft**e*i^^j
^^^^t ^m*^^ <e<^^ptw^e
tion* As a general rule, duties of less importance should
be delegated, and those of greater importance rmMrvwi for
performance by the delegant* Of course, v*mmxrw*& responsi-
bilities should not exceed the capacity of the principal*
Ibid; ** p* 36* X Ibid *» p* 14* 1XXbld *. p. 103*
1 Xbifid** p* 126*.
13
Ifcld *. p. 59*








The responsibilities delegated to subordinates by any
one delegant should be of nearly equal administrative re-
15quirement. If this is not the case, disproportionate
demands will be made upon the delegant for his attention
»
and tasks of lesser importance may receive the same atten-
tion as tasks in a vital area of responsibility* The number
of stages to which responsibilities are delegated should be
held to a practical minimum* Since each principal super-
vises all persons below him in the scalar chain* unnecessary
stages of delegation result in a waste of supervisory ca-
pacity* The number of delegations by any principal is
limited* This is the other side of the coin; however, no
compromise is indicated* When the maximum number of effec-
tive delegations are made, the distribution of additional
responsibility must employ subordinate stages of delegation*
The limitation upon the number of delegations is some-
times referred to as span of control. The span of control
of a superior is restricted by the time he has available to
supervise subordinates, and it is a function of his reserved
responsibilities* The Gjcalcunaa theory supports the above
contention and shows that, with each new subordinate, the
ibid*, p* 59*
15There are cases when this cannot be done* See*
i* OJ fifths** 1*
,f",
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capacity for performance Increases directly, but the com-
16plexity of human relationships increases exponentially.
The human relationships in any organization must be
simple, or friction and inefficiency will result* Thus,
delegated responsibility should be precisely defined, should
be as homogenous as practicable, and should consider the na-
tural abilities and capacities of men* Responsibilities
delegated and responsibilities reserved must be mutually
exclusive* This reduces friction and precludes both dupli-
cate performance and duplicate neglect*
In harmonious organizations, supervision is limited
to the scope of the delegated responsibility* Such super-
vision is exercised only by the delegant, and maximum effec-
tiveness is possible when it encompasses the power of
17
removal and replacement*
The cost of an organizational element must be pro-
portionate to the utility of the purpose for which it is
18intended* A separate inspection department, for example,
may cost more to operate than it saves the organization*
Groups, once popular in organizational structure, can-
not perform responsibilities as well as individuals* If
16Graicunas theory fully discussed by Otto L* Nelson,
National Security and the General Staff (Washington: In-





p* 126. Ibid *, p. 59.
.,
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groups are resorted to, decision mist be by majority opinion.
All group members must have a common principal, and respon-
sibilities must be delegated to the individual members of
19the group.
The requirements of administration are a constantly
changing quantity; therefore, the mission of organisation is
never complete. Time, invention, and changes in the volume
of endeavor must result in changes in the character of en-
deavor. Organisation must reflect these changes. As the
instrument of administration, it must be flexible, and it
must never become sedentary or static. It is the responsi-
bility of every principal to anticipate the requirements of
administration with proper organisational provision.
Organization has been explained as It relates to the
needs of man; it has been defined; the basic principles of
organization have been discussed; and certain working funda-
mentals have been delineated. It is now necessary to
explore certain additional principles especially applicable
to military organization.
Principles of Military Organization . The character of
military organization must be supreme efficiency. It must
reflect the most extreme case of true coordination of effort
if it is to continue to function when literally shot to
19Ibid., p. 218
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20pieces in war* While not violating any of the basic prin-
ciples, the military principles of organisation dictate a
morale of the highest order, a complete unity of doctrine, a
centralization of control, and a decentralisation of opera-
tions and execution*
High morale is a real, though intangible, factor
which is the sum of many psychic qualities* Chief among
these qualities is confidence in the organisation* Moral
purpose alone does not insure high morale* Hannibal's army
was composed of a heterogeneous group of mercenaries ; but it
reflected the highest order of morale, due to confidence in
its organizational structure and efficiency* Organized ef-
ficiency is the great creator and sustainer of high morale,
and it is an essential ingredient of any military establish-
ment*
Unity of doctrine is the bond that ties together all
elements of a military force and is a prerequisite of organ—
21ized efficiency* Doctrine encompasses all the strategic,
tactical, and procedural principles established by the or-
ganization* The doctrine should be a sound one, but above
all it must be the only doctrine* Once established, military
°Mooney, oj£. clt *. p* 125.
21.
Policy (first edition; New Yorki Harper and Brothers, 1957),
p* 403*
.gja







doctrine mist be uniformly enforced and efficiently applied
22by means of the strictest discipline*
Centralised control of the military is essential to
coordination and continuity of effort* Because no military
commander can see and supervise all elements of an organiza-
tion, it is axiomatic that responsibility for the conduct of
actual operations be decentralised* These two principles do
not conflict , due to the presence of a uniform doctrine.
The armies of the French Revolution reflected these concepts
in their organisational structure and Napoleon emphasized
23them in his organisation* His central authority was never
impaired by the highest measure of autonomy in local opera-
tions, due to a unity of enforced doctrine*
With the basic principles of organisation delineated,
and the special principles of military organisation con-
sidered, this first basis for reorganisation can be con-
cluded by a consideration of how line and staff functions
relate to the scalar chain*
"f.T^f^^y.y'jiE,,^K\ *P e> m* ^^••*^e ^^ e*^<"P* ^w^b* ^&^n^^^B^r*&• ^** ^B* ^ej'm,^swB& ^^•»
little in the way of planning, but as rude armies began to
appear, provision for logistic support and weapons utilisa-
tion became an issue* The magnitude of planning and aux-
iliary functions threatened to deny the commander sufficient
22Mooney, ©£. cit * . p* 133* 23Ibid * . p* 134.
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time in which to perform his command and decision responsl-
bilitU.. 24 H«ln Um . bUi. «» U~ «tf .«•« Mto-
tionships which is still valid.
The line, which is pert of the scalar chain » retains
full responsibility for decision and command* The staff 9
which is not part of the scalar chain and has no authority
of its own, pmsformB services of advice and counsel as well
wW SBsmewf 4nk jSS*s^^s se*w *ie fS> sjsjmflF^w efc*ah^e^mes^ «mise e*e*^B* em«m ^wieie Te**» i^ •a ,'*#*p ,wfc#* ji 9 w*sem*sw^*
preting , and support* In short » the staff performs for, and
in the name of, the commander those functions which he would
25
perform if time permitted*
While there is no basic conflict between line and
atn£f functions, a careful balance between centralised staff
functions and decentralised line responsibilities must be
achieved* Extreme centralisation tends to confer a measure
ee«m musree^ip ms,*s» see e^e^e* <^»
^*^b 'Fee m^sswia ^m eB*%m*m e* ^me^^™e e ^eee^mt ue> ee '^fc *• a^ ss#m* e^we* sesm ^^•sim'kmp^^emBs^w
technical staff efficiency, it also sacrifices decentralised
26initiative that is so necessary in war*
Before departing the subject of the staff concept.
24
For a full discussion of staff responsibilities,
see U*S* Department of the Navy, U*$« Naval War College t The
S***?fY *S£ owiojem^M m^yy *Wf* <*wp<*rti u*aTT
Naval War College, 1956), p* 1*
25
•''See Lepawsky, op.* clt * . p* 291*
26
For a discussion of the need for decentralised
mend authority, see Mooney, op.* clt,. p* 40*
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several points must be made abundantly clear with regard to
w»e^l %jrmt wwll %*••' ^h ie^»^i(»wfce»^^^" jm^JBe kg* Jjsjibm ^e>%^aa^h"^P
<
j*e#w jj
refers simply to an organised and coordinated staff service,
every function of which fits into one general plan* A
general staff function means a staff service so general and
constant in its character that it constitutes a continuous
necessity to the organisation as a whole*
The general staff organisation* in itself, is not a
threat to any democratic society, any military service, or
any architect of contemporary strategy* unfortunately, the
opposite impression has been given by many authors* when
improperly organised and constituted, and when granted in-
^emss~^s*so^e^pea* w*m^miwMw sm^m i^ea^pffim ^*» —^^* a ^w 'm» ej^^mwe • •^e^^*^» TW*^e*^^n^T>B* ep'iBr shwi* ^^ • ^s^e* ^^e
its functions of service, support, advice, and counsel*
Then it is no longer a staff, but a corporate command body*
Civilian-Military Relationships * The second basis
for reorganisation is an understanding of the existing
civilian-military conflict* Any reorganisation must provide
for a structure that does not stimulate such conflict and
within which a proper civilian-military relationship can
obtain*
Conflict between the appointed civilian secretaries
and key officers of the military services has acted to
dilute the singleness of purpose so necessary in the











27Department of Defense* Such conflict has been built into
the Defense structure by law. Diverse channels of authority
and access have contributed to the conflict. The delegation
of line authorities to multiple layers of staff assistants
has eroded the position and prestige of top military offi-
28
cers and has precipitated a discontented officer corps.
The manner of many of the appointed "whiz kids" has been as
much a source of dissatisfaction as the substance of their
29detailed directives on matters of administrative trivia.
While military officers are trained to accept and respect
civilian control of the Armed Forces, the proliferation of
civilian secretaries has had an adverse effect.
There is, however, another side to the coin. Rival-
ries between the services and the inability of service rep-
resentatives to agree on key policy Issues has diluted
professional military positions and influence. It is not
surprising that a concomitant lack of raspect for military
27Admiral Anderson spoke of a lack of confidence be-
tween civilian and military leaders. See "How Much is our
Security Jeopardized ?" U..S. News and World Report , LV,
September 16, 1963, p. ?47
28See Hanson W. Baldwin, "Military Deficiencies Laid
to Decisions by Civilians," The New York Times , February 6,
1958, p. 14.
29Understanding is the basis of teamwork. See U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcom-
mittee on National Security Staffing, Administration of Na-




views has developed* Many top military officers have little
appreciation for the political, economic, and psychological
factors so important in national security policy formula-
tion. 30
It is a fact that the principle of civilian supremacy
is one of the more important underpinnings of the American
31democratic system* Based on Constitutional provision and
legislative statute, it is reflected in the structure of the
Federal Government. While there is little doubt that the
military officer is thoroughly imbued with the idea of
civilian supremacy, there is a greater doubt concerning the
definition given to that term* By indirection, the term
will be defined as attention is turned to proper roles for
the military officer and the civilian appointee*
Roles of the Military Officer and the civilian Ap-
pointee * Huch has been written in recent years about an
alleged military threat to the democratic system in the
united States* The burden of this song has been that
military influence on policy matters has increased since
•MM
30
For a discussion of the factors themselves, see
Robert Murphy, "Interlocking Elements in Our National
Security.
"
Department of State Bulletin . XXXVI, Kerch 25,
1957, p* 475*
Vox a full discussion, see Burton Sapin and Richard
C* Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign
Policy ( Garden City,"Hew York* Doubleday and Company , 1954 ) f
p* 52.
*v*a »*»»:. im* *****





World War II, 32 that the "military mind"33 is devoid of cer-
tain democratic values, that the military injects its pref-
34
erence for violence into policy decisions, that military
35thinking is in danger of infecting the populace itself,
and that if the military is not controlled a "garrison state"
will be the result.
The less extreme and more academic view of the prob-
lem of military influence is taken by Lord Lindsay of Birker.
He has written that "• . • the difficulties in the control
of armed force by a democracy illustrate the problem of the
32For an extreme view, see Sapin, op . clt . > p. 1. A
mild approach is taken by Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Military
Move In," Harper's Magazine , CXCV, December 1947, p. 481*
33For discussions of the "military mind," see Sapin,
op . clt . , p. 19, and Richard C. Snyder and Howard W. Bruck,
An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign
Policymaking (Princeton:"" Princeton UnXversity Press, 1954),
p. 45; and Washington Piatt, Strategic Intelligence Produc-
tion (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 18.""
34This point is elaborated on by Sapin, o|>. cit., p.
20.
35For some views on how the military is supposed to
infect the populace, see Harold Laski, Liberty in the Modern
State (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 20; and
Frederic W. Collins, "Military Indoctrination of Civilians,"
New Republic , CXLIV, June 26, 1961, p. 13; and "Military
Role in Fighting Communism," U.S. News and World Report , LI,
September 4, 1961, p. 80.
36For a general discussion of the need to control the
military, see Sapin, op. clt . . p. 55. The "garrison state"
is described by Arthur A. Ekirch, The Civilian and the
Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 19^6)
,
p. 271.
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37democratic control of power In its most acute form* • • •"
President Dwight D. Eisenhower tied the problem of military
influence to the impact on industry of the huge Defense
38budgets when he said, "in the councils of government, we
must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial com-
plex." J*
The defenders of the military officer would say that:
the military officer is recruited from the civilian commu-
nity! he is molded during his formative years by civilian
parents and teachers; he usually lives in a civilian commu-
nity | his children go to civilian schools} his livelihood
depends on the whims of elected civilian representatives,
37For an analysis of the statement made in "The Modern
Democratic State " by I. A. D. Lindsay, see the speech by
Franklyn A. Johnson, "Man on Horseback or a Modern Major
General," Vital Speeches . XXVIII, February 15, 1962, p. 275.
38The Eisenhower remark was made in his farewell ad-
dress on 17 January 1961 and again during a CBS program on
October 12, 1961. For a discussion of the remark, see Fred
J* Cook, "Juggernaut: The Warfare State," Nation , CXCIII,
October 28, 1961, p. 277.
39For discussions of the military-industrial complex,
see David S. 3reenberg, "Who Runs America?" Science ,
CXXXVIII, November 16, 1962, p. 797; and Cook. opT"clt «, p.
282; and "Politics in American Arms," U.S. News and World
Report . LIV, May 13, 1963, p. 40; and ""McNamara's Ground
Rules for Doing Business With the Pentagon," U.S. Mews and
World Report . LIV, May 13, 1963, p. 43; and Frecf J. Cook,
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40
and he returns to civilian life upon retirement. While in
the military service, he learns a higher order of respect
for law and order, authority, discipline, personal sacrifice,
41God, flag, and country than does his civilian contemporary*
He is the first to die in war and the last to expect a bonus
in peace • He is not the subject of conflict of interest in-
vestigations, McCarthy hearings, morals charges, or tax
evasion proceedings.
The military officer no longer advocates universal
42
military training because he has learned, through bitter
experience, that a large segment of the civilian community
is not fit mentally, morally, or physically for service in
43defense of the United States* When he criticizes his
civilian leaders, he does so with the full knowledge that
his career is at stake and that he cannot simply offer his
services to another firm* Defenders of the military officer
40By station at birth, the military officer is more
representative of the American populace than the appointed
secretarial elites*
41For an extreme expression of the same view, see
speech by Barry Goldwater, "National Survival Endangered, n
Vital Speeches . XXVTI, September 15, 1961, p* 717.
42The UMT issue was a major part of allegations made
against the democratic values of the military*
43For a discussion of this point, see "Admiral Burke
Speaks Out About Mussling the Military," **•£• News and World






would say that the "threat" to the democratic system is not
to be found in too much military influence, but in efforts
to insulate the military from participation in national
44
security policy formulation*
The two extreme views of the problem of military im-
pact on policy formulation have been examined* The author
feels compelled to support the latter view, but in a more
academic manner.
The role of the military professional should be the
45
subordinate one envisioned by the Constitution* The mili-
tary officer should be injected into the foreign policy
process only when his contribution cannot as adequately be
46
made by political appointees* The military officer has no
47place in the determination of the national interests* The
44For an eloquent defense of the high values with
which most military officers are imbued, see Louis Banks,
"Naval Tradition and National Vision," U*S* Naval Institute
Proceedings . LXXXIX, July 1963, p. 42*
45For a discussion that supports this view, see
Joseph c* Harsch, "The Place of the Armed Forces in the
Making of National Strategy," Information Service for Offi-
cers , VI, June 1952, p* 25* Some maintain that the Consti-
tution obstructs civilian control* See Samuel P. Hunnington,
"Civilian Control and the Constitution," American Political
Science Review , L, September 1956, p* 676.
46For an entirely different approach, see Arthur Rad-
ford, "We Give Military Advice Only," U.S. News and World
Report . XXXVIII, February 25, 1955, p*~"47.






clarification of the national interests Must remain the task
of elected representatives whose concepts are tested at the
polls* Situational estimates, used in the contemporary
policy process, necessarily include a military estimate of
the situation. The determination of the United States mili-
tary capability and the military capabilities of other
48
states is a province requiring expert application* Assump-
tions regarding the intentions of other states should be
made by the political leadership, with benefit of military
advice*
The selection of objectives and the assignment of
priorities is a political responsibility* The selection of
courses of action must involve the professional officer if
military suitability, feasibility, and acceptability are to
be tested* The decision to act must be reserved to the
49
responsible political leadership* Of course, the imple-
mentation of a course of action involving military means
should involve the widest possible range of military command
flexibility, consistent with political estimates of non-
military factors* The supervision and evaluation of a
48For a discussion of expert and representational
roles, see Snyder, op , cit
• , p* 20*
49The expert adviser and the politically responsible
decision-maker are contrasted by Roger Hilsman, Strategic
Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe, Illinois:










planned military action require the expert application of
military knowledge*
It la easy to see from the above discussion that the
role of the military in American foreign policy formulation
is an extensive one* If the level of East-West tensions
continues to decrease, the role of the military can. and
should, be decreased as the relative importance of military
50
means decreases* The nature of any reorganization of the
Department of Defense should provide for ease of adjustment
in the military role* Clear-cut lines for the exercise of
civilian control should facilitate such adjustment*
This discussion has, thus far, been limited to a
consideration of the role of the military in the foreign
policy process* Attention must now be turned to one tangen-
tial area*
Much has been written about the responsibility of
military officers to speak out in public on national se-
51
curlty policy issues* Attempts to "muzzle the military"
52have been criticized* This entire problem is closely
50For a discussion of this point, see Charles 0*
Lerche, Jr* , Foreign Policy of the American People (Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: "Prentice-Hail , Inc., 1961), p. 468.
51For an example, see "Admiral Burke Speaks Out About
Muzzling the Military," op * cit * , p* 35*
52Senator Strom Thurmond (D-SC) even initiated an in-
vestigation* See "We Are Professional Men," Time , LXXIX,
February 16, 1962, p* 21*
.'
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associated with the use of professional military officers to
53
speak in support of administration policies.
The military officer is disciplined to accept the
decisions of his superiors and to make his best effort to
implement those decisions effectively. Once a decision is
made, the military officer should neither criticize that de-
54
cision, nor be required to legitimate it. He has, however,
a responsibility to advance again his professional advice to
55
any Congressional committee, " for the Congress is the other
eg
arm of civilian control. President Dwight D. Eisenhower
summed the matter up in his letter to the Congress of April
24, 1954, in which he said,
Basic decisions relating to the military forces
must be made by politically responsible civilian
officials. Conversely, professional military leaders
must not be thrust into the political arena to be-
come the prey of partisan politics.
§
7
53See Sapin, 0£. cit . , p. 61.
54For an example, see Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y.
Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy , Politics , and Defense
Budgets (New York; Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 520.
55Defense regulations on the subject are described by
SECDEF McNaraara. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy
Machinery, Organizing for National Security—'Hearings
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961;, p. 1201.
56The Congress sets the limits within which the
President can act in the area of national security affairs.
For a full discussion, see U.S. Congress, Administration of
National Security , op . cit., p. 2.








Xnterservlco Rivalry, Understanding of the destruc-
tive aspects of interservlce rivalry will form the third,
and final, basis for reorganisation of the Department of
Defense* Interservice rivalry should not be confused with
Interservlce competition. The latter Is a healthy state of
affairs that exists between the four combatant services and
contributes to a striving for excellence and a resultant
esprit . Interservlce rivalry Is that destructive force ex-
hibited In budget debates, weapons system control disputes,
conflicts &smr roles and missions, etc*
Many military officers cannot rise above loyalties
imposed by service education, training, and environment*
Others, using service experience as a foundation, have de-
veloped greater loyalties and risen to positions of military
and national prominence* By far, the large majority of flag
and general office cs are of this latter group* Some striking
recent examples are General Dwight D* Elsenhower, who as
President approved a series of policies that reduced the
Army to a position of relative impotence, and Admiral Arthur
w. Radford, who, as chairman Joint Chiefs, made a complete
Townsend Hoopes, "Civillan-iUlitary Balance ,* Yale Review,
XLXII, winter 1954
.
The destructive aspects of interservlce rivalry are




about-face and supported the strategic concepts of the Air
Force*
Some senior officers feel a strong sense of "loyalty
down" to the service that perpetuated their careers and
through which they advanced to positions of prominence*
Many, perhaps unconsciously, advocate concepts of warfare
59that increase the relative importance of their service*
Others may consciously do so. in ignorance of the capabili-
ties of the other services, or as a result of an honest lack
of confidence in the performance of the other branches of
the Armed Forces*
Many attempts have been made to solve the problem of
interservice rivalry* Joint service colleges, revised, per-
formance reporting procedures, exchange programs, and re-
quirements for duty on joint or combined staffs have hMtn
the type of devices employed* Interservice rivalry continues
to the detriment of military effectiveness* It would appear
that basic organisational changes will be necessary if the
problem is to be aoo^uataly coped with* Care must be taken
in any organisational change to retain the advantages of
healthy interservice competition*
59A slightly different view was expressed by Joseph
Alsop, "The Case of McHamara and the Joint Chiefs," Readers
Digest . LXXXIII, July 1963, p. 102.
'
See Paul Y* Hammond, Organising for Defense




Violations of the principle* of organisation, the
civilian-military conflict, and interservice rivalry are
considered to be the sources of all the significant defects
in the Department of Defense organisation* Sach of these
areas has been explored, as a basis for reorganisation*
Attention can now be turned to the task of developing a plan
for reorganisation of the Department of Q*f*Mi***
M - ; : : :,"..V -..-
CHAPTER VIII
PLAN FOR DEFENSE REORGANIZATION
I believe that military and political factors are
so interwoven that they cannot be separated into
clear, well-defined categories, and that both must
be mastered as a prerequisite to sound military and
naval concepts* High ranking officers who hold
positions of responsibility in the military depart-
ments must be thoroughly aware of the delicate
sensitivities involved throughout the broad spectrum
of international policy* The education, outside
reading, duty patterns, and promotion processes of
the officer corps must be designed to achieve this
result. 1
The requirements of administration are a constantly
changing quantity; therefore, the mission of organization is
never complete* As an instrument of administration, organi-
zation must be flexible and must never become sedentary or
static* It is the responsibility of Department of Defense
management to anticipate the requirements of departmental
administration with proper organizational provision*
Management must consider the fact that any reorgani-
zation is disruptive in nature and that its immediate effect
may not be increased efficiency* Any reorganization plan
for the Department of Defense must be considered in the
light of that fact and must be so cleverly implemented by
The chapter title quotation is taken from President
John F* Kennedy »s personal letter to SECNAV designate Paul
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management that a period of military vulnerability does not
develop* An evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, re-
organization is the most acceptable type* Implementation of
any reorganization plan is best accomplished on a phase-in
basis* Such a reorganisation of the Department of Defense
is critically required at this time*
The Goal of Reorganization * Prior to the development
of a detailed plan for the reorganization of the Department
of Defense, it is essential to determine some standards upon
which to measure the performance of the end product* Such a
measure of performance can be developed by envisioning the
manner of operation of an ideal Department of Defense*
An initial requirement of the organization would be
an executive superstructure that provided the Department of
Defense with clearly and precisely defined national objec-
tives* Strategy for the implementation of such objectives
would be of a long-range and comprehensive nature and re-
quire coordinated political, military, economic, cultural,
and psychological means* The design of an executive struc-
ture which woul'" provide such coordination is beyond the
scope of this effort*
With precisely-defined national objectives as a basis,
the Department of Defense would participate with a single
voice in the development of national security policies*
Then, with a singleness of purpose, the Department would
*< d&imstlirv











recommend supporting military objectives and associated
military courses of action* Military strategy would pro-
vide for effective and balanced participation in general
war, limited war, and war short of limited war* A single,
but flexible, doctrine would provide for reliability in de-
centralised operations* This doctrine would be reinforced
by a singleness of purpose, a unity of command, and effec-
tive military discipline*
The tew Department of Defense organisation would be
sensitive to the Constitutional provisions for civilian con-
trol of the military and would provide for effective execu-
tive-legislative liaison* Centralized civilian policy
control would be blended with professional military advice,
planning, and direction at the very top* The highest pos-
sible levels of economy and efficiency would be provided by
the effective integration of military and nonmilitary fac-
tors*
Precise military strategic concepts and plans wouta
be developed to achieve military objectives, and these plans
would be translated into carefully-defined implementing
tasks and missions* Such concepts and plans would be inte-
grated with the developing technological state of the art,
basic military requirements, and budgetary considerations*
All military capabilities would be fused into one cohesive
pattern in support of military plans*
—"-"
s'lx' ' 'i. ::. : :" .;*
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One* plans were developed and the means to Implement
them provided, the structure would anticipate enemy capa-
bilities and the trends of modern war* Clans would ha
revised accordingly, as would the assignment of tasks and
missions* Machinery would be developed to provide instan-
taneous reaction to enemv attack in a manner characterized
by 8peed, responsiveness, control, and precise decision-
making*
The organisational structure would provide for the
effective ut ligation of scientific manpower* Basic re-
search, applied research, development, and evaluation would
be well coordinated to produce weapons systems required by
strategic concepts* While fostering orderly innovation, the
research and development machinery would reduce needless
duplication of effort and expedite the "womb to boom** cycle*
The sound organisational structure would foster con-
fidence in the D*£*a** organisation, with a resultant high
morale of its members* High morale, when reinforced by
adequate military and civilian compensation, would effec-
tively provide a strong personnel structure*
With the ideal performance described above as a
standard, an organisational structure for the Department of
Defense will now be developed* The structure will be sensi-
tive to every basic principle of organisation, to limita-
tions imposed upon military reorganisation in the United
..-•..
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States* and to the lessons of past reorganizations. It will
provide every swans possible to reduce civilian-military
conflict and interservice rivalry*
Defense organisation envisioned by the author has no single
service, no single Chief of Staff, no Joint Chiefs of ataf ( ,
no Assistant Secretaries of Q*£e*i*m $ and no boards or com-
mittees* The Secretary of Defense and his deput are the
only civilian appointees* Phe Secretary of Defense has ab-
solute authority, control, direction, and command over the
elements of the department of Defense, subject only to the
orders of the President (Commander in Chief) and limited by
organisational plans, appropriations, and regulations of the
Congress* He is the sole military adviser to the President
and the only Department of Defense representative on the
National Security Council*
The Secretary of Defense, assisted by a Defense Staff,
directly commands the five military commands* (See Chart
26, p* 127* ) These military commands are functionally or-
ganised in cases where the mission is global and organised
by theaters where the coordination of global operations is
not feasible* The arrangement neglects no function or area
of the globe and is sensitive to the forty-four military
agreements to which the United States is a signatory*
















































Chart 26. Proposed Department oi Defense Organization
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forces: the Strategic Air Force, with its bomber wings; the
Intercontinental Missile Force, with its fixed and mobile
missile wings; the Strategic Naval Force, with missile sub-
marines and attack carrier groups; and an embryonic Strate-
gic Space Force* (See Chart 27, p. 12S , ) The mission of
this command is to provide a balanced capability to deter
general nuclear war* Elements of this force can be employed
by theater commanders in war short of general war if the
Secretary of Defense determines that the deterrent require-
ments will permit reassignment of these elements*
The Continental Defense Command is composed of three
forces x the Air D^fenme Force, with its warning, inter-
ceptor, missile, and space reconnaissance groups; the Anti-
submarine Defense Force, with Atlantic and Pacific groups
each assigned hunter-killer, patrol, warning, and harbor
&as% elements; and a Civil Defense Force, with anti-
subversion, civil installation, and post-attack recovery
groups* (See Chart 28, p* 130* ) The plan recognises the
threat imposed by enemy missile submarines* The mission of
this command is to protect and defend the United States from
any nature of enemy attack* Elements of this force can be
diverted to other uses when the Secretary of Defense deter-
mines that the threat to the United States permits*
A Theater Combat Command is provided and is composed
of a European Command, Atlantic Command, Polar Command,

















































(a) Armed Forces Commander
(b) Air Force Commander
(c) Navy Commander
Chart 27.
































































PROPOSED CONTINENTAL DEFENSE COMMAND ORGANIZATION




Pacific Command, and South Asia Command. (Sea chart 29, p.
132.) By inclusion of a Polar Command and South Asia Com-
mand, balanced forces are provided throughout the free world
for the conduct of all types of war* Elements of the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are trained for combat and
then assigned to the Theater Combat Command* Such elements
represent every possible type of force, and they can be
assigned and reassigned within the Theater Combat Command as
the threat shifts from theater to theater* Once a unit is
assigned to the Theater Combat Command, the parent service
has no control of, or responsibility to, the unit until it
is rotated for additional type-training*
A Military Training Command is planned and is com-
posed of the existing three services* The services are re-
constituted as training forces under Chiefs of Training*
(See chart $©, p* 123 •) This command is responsible for
training Army, Navy, and Air Force units and replacement
personnel for assignment to the Theater Combat Command, the
Strategic Deterrent Command, and the continental D*fma&*
Command* Retrain* is conducted on a rotational basis,
upon the request of the employing commander. Thus, speciali-
zation is maintained in the basic arts of war. The functional
areas of training responsibility are precisely defined and
no basis for friction exists.
The last of the five military commands is the Defense
I It nil 'I,.. iU, y., [ « s£i
































































(c) Navy Commander r -- :
.













































Proposed Military Training Command Organization
LINE STAFF







Material Command. This command is responsible for the pro*
curement, production, development, supply, and delivery of
all the materials of war required by the other four commands.
Subordinate commands are provided to perform each of these
functions, and military personnel and units are assigned to
duty in the Defense Material Command on a rotational basis
by the Secretary of Defense* (See Chart 31, p. 13 5*}
To assist and advise the Secretary afenae, and to
provide common support and inspection services, a Defease
Staff is provided* This staff has five directorates, each
headed by a military officer and staffed by military and
Civil Service personnel* Assigned personnel have no command
or supervisory authority outside their directorates* There
la a Director of Defense Administration that is responsible
for the following functions s legal counsel, public affairs,
historical and legislative affairs, and promulgation of all
Defense directives*
The Director of Defense Intelligence is responsible
for all military intelligence functions. Ho service intelli-
gence organizations exist* The directorate is composed of
branches responsible for intelligence collection, analysis,
production, distribution, and security* Special Operations,
Central Intelligence Liaison, and national Security Agency
sections are provided*
The Director of Defense Operations Is responsible for
-esq **i*

















































Proposed Defense Material Command Organization
Line
(b) Army Commander
Staff (a) Armed Forces Commander
(c) Navy Commander (d) Air Force Commander
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maintenance of a Oafansa command center complex, the manage-
ment of all world-wide Ximf^nme communications activity, and
the administration of all Defense military assistance pro-
grams* He advises the Secretary of Defense on the conduct
of all current operations*
The Director of Defense Plans is responsible for the
coordination of all politico-military policy formulation,
operational planning, budgeting, and military requirements
functions* His directorate provides National Security Coun-
cil liaison, develops strategic concepts, promulgates
Defense doctrine, prepares all top Defense plans, and re-
views subordinate plans*
The Director of Defense Logistics performs functions
in the area of research and development review, Atomic
Energy Commission liaison, personnel administration, man-
power utilization, industrial mobilization, property and
installation management, industrial liaison, military educa-
tion, and logistic coordination*
Having described the military commands and the De-
fense Staff organization that are envisioned, it is appro-
priate to discuss briefly the personnel structure, military
requirement procedures, and budgeting functions* The
Director of DmfeiiB« Logistics is responsible to the Secre-
tary of Defense for centralized personnel management,







officer and enlisted personnel are trained for careers in
one of the three service branches by the Milita y Training
Command. An officer can rise to three-star rank in his
service branch » can command major forces assigned to the
three line combat commands, and can rotate to assignments in
the two major support commands* Very select officers of
senior rank (lieutenant conmander or major) are provided
additional war college education, cross-service experience
»
and postgraduate training* They are then commissioned in
the Armed" rorcea o£ £&£ T3n£|ed states and can rise to four-
star rank* The five military commands, and the next level
of command in their substructure, must be commanded by
officers of the Armed Forces * All senior billets on the
i>*£*n»* Staff are filled by officers of the Armed Forces on
a rotational basis* Thus, within the combat units » the
service branches provide a vehicle for healthy competition,
service esprit , and specialisation* Outstanding senior
officers, of proven ability and exhibited loyalty to the
entire organisation, are selected, educated, and trained for
command and staff assignments as officers of the Armed
Forces * Of course, a distinctive uniform would be provided
this group*
Military requirements are generated by the five line
commands, reviewed by the Defense Staff for budgetary feasi-
bility, operational necessity, logistic feasibility, and
--
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planning consonance* when approved by the Secretary of
Defense, the requirements are passed to the Defense Material
Command and form a basis for all development arid production
effort* Line commanders are kept advised of research break-
throughs and possible weapons system applications* Planning,
budgeting, and research effort are closely coordinated with
military requirements at the Defense Staff level* Budgets
are prepared for two-year periods, are based upon require-
ments and plans, and are developed upon a mission basis*
Estimates are presented for the two succeeding budget
periods, and tentative approval is secured for planning
purposes
•
This Department of DttfenM^t organisation plan is not a
static one* It is flexible and provides for modification as
changes occur in technology, the art of war, the national
objectives, and the threat to the United States* It cannot
be implemented in one grand reorganization without unac-
ceptable disruption of the existing organisation* Phases
must be developed for implementation over a ten to fifteen
year period* Then, and only then, may the United States
enjoy an efficient Defense organisation that is devoid of
structural defect, civilian-military conflict, and inter-
service rivalry*
Resultant Impact on Politico-Military Policy Formula-




nothing but a healthy effect upon politico-military policy
formulation in the Department of Defense* Best tea the fact
that such policy formulation would take place in an environ-
ment without atructural defect, civilian-military conflict,
or interservice rivalry, other direct benefits would obtain*
The number of formal policy units would be reduced
from six to one, with an attendant simplification of hori-
sontal coordination* Officers filling policy formulation
billets would be of the Armed Forces and would have the
benefit of war college education and postgraduate training
in international relations* The policy staff would be en-
riched with permanent Civil Service personnel and Department
of State exchange officers*
With such changes in the policy structure of the
Department of Defense, it is envisioned that well-coordinated
^^w^mie eeetMaveMvS* *s>^j a* %^e* e^a%e*e*^me*^m^a a^^»»e» ,«krmt*^F a» e^^fc^^iWF^P^^^peawaem^iMai^^asav we* a»<* m^^w <* %nfc
warded to the Secretary for consideration* Then the require-
ment of the late President for a military that is "thoroughly
aware of the delicate sensitivities involved throughout the








The fundamental safety of the nation has become the
primary consideration In the conduct of relatione with other
nations , and the national interest in self-defense, when
applied to the contemporary world situation, has resulted in
a selection of objectives which dictate the maintenance of a
substantial military establishment* with the increasing
importance of the military as a means for accomplishing na-
tional objectives, the military dimension of foreign-policy
formulation has been extended across the full spectrum of
the policy process* The vehicle of military participation
is the Department of D^fmaBm*
The existing Defense organisation has been the prod*
uct of an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary, process*
The national Security Act of 1947, which is the basis for
central unified effort by the Armed Forces, was a piece of
compromise legislation* The structure which the Act pro-
vided has been modified by a series of amendments and re-
organisation plans* It is within this structure that the
politico-military policy units of the Department of QmttaiMm
are to be found*
Politico-military policy formulation In the Depart-
ment of the Navy is considered to be representative hat
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to be found in each of the Military departments. The policy
unit is located among the staff elements of the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations* It is staffed almost en-
tirely by Naval officers who exercise no line authority* It
functions to formulate the Navy politico-military policy
positions which the Chief of Naval Operations can advance
through the many channels open to him*
The Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint staff
acts as the primary politico-military policy formulation
unit of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* The Joint Chiefs, in
their capacity as principal military advisers to the Presi-
dent f the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense, review the policy formulations of the Joint Staff
and the military departments* They then forward their own
recommendations via the multiple channels available to them*
It falls to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs to coordinate the politico-
military policy of the Department of Defense*
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs is all-powerful in influencing the politico-
military policy positions of the Department* His only
channel for advancing recommendations is direct to the
Secretary of Defense* ISA completely overshadows the policy






in the structure and by reason of a unique line authority*
ISA* s sole competitor is the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
These policy units function within a structure that
is permeated with defects* The defects of the structure
affect the performance of the policy units, the efficiency
of the entire Department , and the credltability of the na-
tional defense posture* Analysis reveals that these de-
fects can he traced to one or more of three basic causes-
violations of the basic principles of organisation, civilian-
military conflict, and interservice rivalry*
The author has advanced a plan for reorganization of
the Department of Defense* TV I plan eliminates the causes
of the defects in the Defense structure and provides a
healthy environment for the formulation of well-coordinated
and properly-conceived politico-military policy* If reduc-
tion in the military dimension of foreign policy can be the
result of decreasing world tensions, and not due to an
absence of creditable Defense participation in the policy
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